

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION SCENARIOS IN GLOBAL EUROPE: FORWARD-LOOKING UP TO 2050

Dugoročni pogled na imigracije i integracije migranata u Evropi: scenariji do 2050.

ABSTRACT *The author develops a forward-looking approach to immigration and integration of immigrants in global Europe. She discusses population prospects in the light of several migration hypotheses including “business as usual”, replacement migration, and recruitment of immigrants to fill in the gaps in the labour supply. She develops “No immigration into European Union” as shock hypothesis for the forward-looking storyline and identifies the key social consequences of zero immigration desired in some policy circles. She proposes addressing integration of immigrants scenarios alongside demographic projections and labour market needs for future assessments of needs for immigrants and for responsible governance.*

KEY WORDS *immigration, integration, immigration hypotheses, zero immigration, forward-looking*

APSTRAKT *Autorka razvija dugoročni pogled na imigracije i integracije migranata u globalnoj Evropi. Ona razmatra kretanje stanovništva u svetlu nekoliko imigracionih hipoteza uključujući scenarije “sve po starom”, “imigracije radi obnavljanje stanovništva”, i “regrutovanje migranata za potrebe tržišta rada”. Ona postavlja hipotezu “Evropska unija bez novih migranata” kao šok kartu za narativ o budućnosti stanovništva i društvenim posledicama blokade imigracija za koju se zalažu pojedini politički krugovi. Autorka predlaže da se scenariji o integracijama migranata razmatraju uporedo sa demografskim projekcijama i procenama o potrebama tržišta rada kao preduslov za odgovorno upravljanje društvom.*

KLJUČNE REČI *imigracije, integracije, imigracione hipoteze, Evropa bez novih migranata, perspektive stanovništva*

Introduction

The key demographic issues, and in particular challenges that population ageing and increased longevity pose for public spending and governance, are generally known. What is less apparent, but relevant for our reflections about the future, relates to some underpinning assumptions of population projections, in particular regarding migration, which impact the perception of the scope of demographic challenges. The most recent World Population Prospects: The 2010

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Revision (United Nations, 2011) introduced considerable changes to the fertility assumptions and some relatively small changes regarding mortality by taking into account the possible impact of HIV/AIDS on mortality. However, the UN Population Division's normal migration assumption is embedded in "business as usual" thinking.

Population projections based on "business as usual" hypothesis

According to the United Nations 2010 population prospects (*ibid*), or medium variant projections, Europe's population² will decline, as will the Chinese population. In China, the effect of one child policy will result in decrease of the population size and accelerated population ageing from 2030 onwards. North America, and in particular India are among the powerhouse that will see their population grow in the next few decades up to 2050. Europe's population is expected to decrease in the first half of the 21st century by some 8 million people, from 726 million in 2000 to 719 million in 2050³. In percent of the world population, Europe's share will further decrease from 12 to 8 percent between 2000 and 2050 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Population prospects up to 2050 in major powerhouses in the world




Figure based on data from World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision (United Nations, 2011)

In the 2010 Revision of the World Population Prospects a new, probabilistic method for projecting total fertility has been used. Mortality is projected on the basis

² Europe according to the United Nations-Population Division includes also the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. In this paper, unless otherwise specified, Europe includes the Russian Federation.

³ The robustness of population projections for governance needs to be considered in the light of the weight that changes in the underpinning hypotheses bring about. Indeed, changes and adjustments made in the 2010 United Nations Revision in relation to procedures followed just two years earlier for the 2008 version have as consequence that the expected population decline in Europe is lower in the newest version. Indeed, in 2008 the projected population size of Europe in 2050 was 691 million while the projected size according to the 2010 revised version is 719 million.

of models of change of life expectancy produced by the United Nations Population Division, with smaller expected gains the higher the life expectancy already reached. Under the normal migration assumption, the future path of international migration is set on the basis of past international migration estimates and consideration of the policy stance of each country with regard to future international migration flows. Projected levels of net migration are generally kept constant over the next decades, except for Europe (Figure 2). After 2050, it is assumed that net migration will gradually decline (ibid).

Figure 2: Yearly net number of migrants (in thousands) in major powerhouses in the world




Figure based on data from World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision (United Nations, 2011)

Thus, based on the expected long term fertility recovering at the replacement level in Europe expected gains in longevity, and normal migration assumption, between 2000 and 2050 Europe’s seniors (65+) will have increased from 15 percent to 29 percent over half a century. In absolute figures, this means growth from 107 million to 194 million, i.e. an increase of 87 million elderly people. The same assumption implies that the population of active age (15 to 59 years of age) in Europe will have decreased between 2000 and 2050 from 451 million to 363 million, i.e. a decrease of 88 million potentially active people. In percentage the decrease is from 62 to 51.

This decrease of the number of people of active age is not limited to Europe and it is expected to affect also the Chinese population, and quite remarkably so as may be seen in Figure 3. Yet, the migration assumptions are kept “normal/business as usual”.

Figure 3: Population 15 to 59 years of age in major powerhouses in the world




Figure based on data from World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision (United Nations, 2011)

Migration hypotheses revisited

The plausibility of the “business as usual” scenario based on the normal migration assumption may be challenged on at least two grounds. On the one hand, there is high migration pressure on Europe and “fortress Europe” scenario is a highly unlikely scenario in view of permeability of Europe’s borders. On the other hand, Europe needs immigrants to address labour shortages in some sectors of economy and to offset some of the negative effects of accelerated population ageing. Thus, business as usual may be both unrealistic and undesirable.

Pressure of youth in the neighbouring regions will also be remarkable. In 1950 Southern Europe had some 20 million people aged 15 to 24; in 2050 it is expected to fall below 15 million. In Northern Africa there were 10 million youth in 1950 and in 2050 there will be some 45 million (see Figure 4).

We may expect that immigration pressure on Europe will persist, because of the demographic pressures from high fertility least developed countries, and due to economic disparities, wars, family formation and family reunion. Furthermore, Europe needs immigrants especially in some sectors of its economy that have been chronically underfunded in the past in many countries (e.g. nursing and care giving professions, ICT, research, etc.).

After 2018, European economies may face considerable shortages in their labour supply. Expected changes relate to an ageing workforce, and feminisation of the workforce, and growing needs for migrant workers. In a longer term prospective - up to mid 21st century - demography will be an ever stronger driver for change with more jobs than active people in ageing Europe.

Figure 4: Population 15 to 24 years of age in Southern Europe and Northern Africa




Figure based on data from World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision (United Nations, 2011)

Replacement migration

In the late 20th century, many European governments refused to address fertility issues (which are underpinning population ageing together with increases in longevity) arguing that fertility choices belong to the private sphere and that immigration could be a quick-fix to Europe's ageing. The United Nations Population Division (2001) undertook a simple demographic scenario exercise. An answer to the question if replacement migration is a solution to declining and ageing populations was a courageous, and what proved to be a rather unpopular exercise in some circles. The scenarios offered, nevertheless, much food for thought at all levels of governance. We have selected only 3 scenarios to highlight the key demographic messages: medium variant generally considered as the plausible one, constant population size and constant potentially active population.

- *Medium variant scenario.* According to this scenario Europe would have net intake of 428,000 immigrants per year, for a net total of some 23.500,000 migrants during the period. By 2050, 4.3 percent of the population would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendents⁴.
- *Migration required to maintain the size of the population at its maximum of 728 million scenario.* A net total of 100 million migrants would be required during the period 1995-2050 (to maintain the population at its 1995 level); this corresponds, on average, to 1.8 million immigrants per year. By 2050, out of the total population close to 18 percent would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendents.

⁴ UN Population Division used in 2001 lower figures for immigration and somewhat different fertility hypotheses than for their 2011 version presented in our Figure 3.

- *Migration required to maintain the size of the working age population (15-64) constant scenario.* A total of 161 million migrants would be required over the period 2005-2050. This is an average of 3.6 million migrants per year during 45 years, and would imply that some 209 million, or 26 percent of Europe's citizens would be post-2005 immigrants or their descendants.

Figure 5: Replacement migration Europe: average annual net migration (in thousands)




Figure based on data from United Nations Population Division 2001

The United Nations report shows that only huge numbers of immigrants would neutralize the ageing process, but would result in a phenomenal increase in population size.

Replacement migration, of course, was a simple demographic scenario exercise. More comprehensive studies require taking into account possible increases in age at retirement, increase in female labour force participation including full-time employment on top of part-time⁵, decrease of unemployment, especially among already resident immigrants and their descendants, and mass introduction and take up of new ICT technologies (e.g. Ambient Assistive Living, telecare, e-governance, etc.). But the demographic message remains valid for future governance in Europe: we need to slow down the intensity of ageing in the near future, although we may not be able to alter the direction of the changes in the age structure by the end of the 21st century.

In order to address population ageing fertility issues will need to be addressed eventually. Indeed, for the long term population projections the United Nations (2011) uses the normative hypothesis that fertility will approach and fluctuate around the replacement level of 2.1. This hypothesis is driven by the extension of the projection horizon from 2050 to 2100 and of the underlying fertility assumption

⁵ The Netherlands has the second highest participation of women in the labour force in the European Union, 71.5 percent of all women are in gainful employment. But, three quarters of Dutch women work on the part time basis making them number one in Europe in this respect (Avramov, 2011).

which is normative and only partly underpinned by experience of some below replacement countries in Europe and East Asia (for references see United Nations, 2011). The new Population Division assumption of a population stabilization is expected to occur within three to four generations.

EU Global Europe 2030-2050 scenario: one million recruited immigrant workers per year

Economic considerations in terms of labour force needs are the basis for many foresight studies (see Brown, 2010). The term “forward-looking activities” includes all exercises with a long term vision derived through qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative methods. The European Commission had established in 2010 the Expert Group on The World and Europe up to 2050: EU policies and research priorities (Global Europe 2050) which had as mandate *inter alia* to evaluate quantitatively and qualitatively the underlying trends and tensions for the world and Europe on the basis of a set of specific hypotheses covering political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technological developments, generate “alternative scenarios”, and highlight future European research priorities (European Commission, 2012).

For addressing the distant future, Global Europe 2050 experts (for the list of experts see European Commission, 2012) identified a number of unfolding trends that matters globally for all future scenarios in each of the following six dimensions:

- Geopolitics and governance: EU frontiers, integration and role on the global stage;
- Global demographic and societal challenges;
- Territorial and mobility dynamics;
- Economy and technology prospects;
- Energy and natural resource security and efficiency, environment and climate change;
- Research, education and innovation.

The time horizon (2030-2050) of this study and its all-encompassing scope (Europe and the world) European Union experts called for a balanced combination of daring ambition and down-to-earth realism (ibid).

“Forward-looking exercises are not set out to forecast or predict the future, especially with such long term perspective as adopted here, but rather to provide images of possible futures that can stimulate and inspire policy and decision makers, and society at large. Such visions of the future should not be constrained by mainstream, conventional thinking, hence the above reference to the daring dimension of the study. On the other hand, to effectively serve the objective of influencing policy and decision making, the proposed visions of the future should be credible, and build upon past and present knowledge, hence the reference to realism” (ibid: 19).

For the qualitative analysis three scenarios have been built and analyzed, where the global perspective is combined with a specific focus on the future of European integration (ibid: 20 and 21):

- *Nobody cares: standstill in European integration.* In this scenario, Europe Union is seen “muddling through” in the absence of a redesigned policy framework. Economic growth remains low in Europe, and the divergence between the EU and the USA economies widens. The challenges posed by the ageing phenomenon are not decisively addressed, leading to economic unsustainability. Completion of the European market remains unachieved. There is limited public support to address climate change and other global challenges, leading among others to an increased dependence on the foreign supply of energy;
- *EU under threats: a fragmented Europe.* This scenario envisages a global economic decline, with protectionist reactions, the subsequent increase in transaction costs and increasingly congested infrastructures. A range of serious geopolitical risks arise including possible civil wars, nuclear conflicts and the radicalization of governments in advanced democracies. The EU heads towards disintegration, triggered by the possible withdrawal of one or more leading Member States and the emergence of two or more speeds within the Union. Climate change is not addressed. Food and oil shocks materialize, with major energy supply disruptions and failures of the grid system. The failure of Europe to implement sound research policies leads to a reduction in the pace of innovation and the total productivity factor (TFP)⁶ gains diminish progressively until 2050 within the EU, compared to the nobody cares scenario, the rest of the world keeping its own pace;
- *EU renaissance: further European integration.* In this scenario global security is achieved, with the generalized enforcement of human rights and of the rule of law. The world undergoes a global democratization of power also as a consequence of the mounting role of networks, non state actors and the media. The EU is enlarged both east- and southwards, and consolidates its integration (political, military, fiscal). There is strong public support toward radical targets in e.g. climate change and energy efficiency, and the all-continental integration of energy systems boosts the share of renewable energy. Innovation systems undergo major reforms to become increasingly systemic (technical, social, organizational). Importantly, the EU manages to best shape its technological and research policies, to target the right domains and methods, and this leads to an acceleration in the pace of innovation and the TFP gains increase progressively until 2050 within the EU, compared to the nobody cares scenario, the rest of the world keeping its own pace.

⁶ Total factor productivity (TFP) is a close proxy for differences in technology and innovation performance levels, the latter closely related to income gaps between countries. The EU27 productivity gap with the US in 2008 was about 50% in GDP per capita or 28% in GDP per hour worked (Ricci et al. 2010: 11).

For the quantitative analysis under Global Europe 2030-2050, the MIRAGE model using the approach of Fontagné, Fouré and Ramos (2011) was applied. The main variables in the scenario modelling for the EU renaissance as the possible and most desirable future included migration into EU set at one million recruited immigrants, aged 20-45, per year in view of meeting EU labour force needs between 2030 and 2050. For this scenario the EU expert group member Avramov elaborated a simulation of the total number of immigrants resulting from labour recruitment. If EU would aim at recruiting one million workers per year to meet its labour force needs it would need to integrate some 62 million people with immigrant background (see Table 1). This is because immigrants are accompanied by spouse, get children, and bring over family members.

Table 1: Total number of immigrants as result of recruiting one million workers per year between 2030 and 2050

Year	Number of immigrants (in thousands)
2030	2000
2031	4150
2032	6525
2033	9225
2034	12325
2035	15425
2036	18525
2037	21625
2038	24725
2039	27825
2040	30925
2041	34025
2042	37125
2043	40225
2044	43325
2045	46625
2046	49525
2047	52625
2048	55725
2049	58825
2050	61925

Own calculations are based on estimations about future trends in family behaviour of immigrant workers:

Hypothesis 1: 80 % of immigrants are accompanied or followed by spouse

Hypothesis 2: 80 % of couples get on average two children

Hypothesis 3: 10% of immigrants are accompanied or followed by parent(s).

Recruiting one million worker immigrants aged 20-45 per year between 2030 and 2050, due to family development and family reunification, results in minimum 62 million post 2030 immigrants and their descendants in the European Union in 2050. To this figure, of course, we need to add the “unsolicited” immigrants such as

refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented immigrants coming in over the two decades.

EU 2030-2050 shock: no immigration into the European Union “wild card”

Like all the state of the art foresight studies Global Europe 2030-2050 used “wild cards” for its storylines. These “out of the box” eventualities or “wild cards” perspectives and discontinuities are introduced as windows in the main storylines.⁷ A “wild card” for the storyline developed by Avramov is as follows. The failure to integrate asylum seekers, refugees, third country nationals coming to EU for family formation or family re-unification reasons, and undocumented immigrants, could result in widespread fear of foreigners and pressure on governments to seal immediately borders for newcomers.

The following socio-economic consequences of zero migration are identified.

- Zero migration would have a quite substantial effect on the total population size making Europe less crowded, and there would be less competition for paid work;
- At the same time shortages of workers in specific sector of economy would no longer be compensated by recruitment abroad. There would be no more brain gain through professional migration of talented and highly skilled workers;
- Pressure on public services for child care and old age care would increase as those immigrants who are already in EU would not be allowed to bring their kin as family and informal care givers;
- European Universities would become less attractive and less competitive, with fewer foreign students and no foreign gatekeepers of excellence;
- Some University and research departments would close down;
- International geographic mobility would be partly compensated by digital mobility but Europe will no longer be significantly tipping into a wider talent pool for research and innovation;
- Added value of diversity and multi-layered cultural background of people would be lost and Europe would be less innovative in producing goods and services tailored for world markets;
- The closing of borders to newcomers would be shaped by geographic permeability of EU necessitating strong dissuasive and punitive measures;

⁷ A wild card is a future development or event with a relatively low probability of occurrence but a likely impact on the conduct of business. “Positive” wild cards (from the point of view of the EU) are included in the “Renaissance” storyline, whereas “negative” wild cards are inserted in the “EU under threats” storyline (Ricci et al. 2010: 3).

- This could imply that immigrants would be deported at their own cost and doctors and other professionals who help immigrants would be charged and punished;
- The Council of Europe and national legislations on family reunification would have to be revoked;
- Europeans would be marrying Europeans, and adopting only European children;
- They would be reluctant to study abroad or work abroad to avoid falling in love with a foreigner;
- If they marry a foreigner they would either have to emigrate or live separate life from spouse and children;
- EU Treaties would have to undergo substantial revision. The way people perceive and experience otherness would change together with values embedded in the European culture such as freedom of choice in family matters, or humanitarian principles;
- With no immigrants coming from distant cultures there would be slowing down of growth in numbers of Muslims in EU that could result in weakening of Islamophobic attitudes;
- At the same time perceived differences between Christian and secular values, between denominational groups, ethnic minorities, and non-integrated natives could become more important than today;
- Fear and dislike of people from countries outside EU and within EU could resurge from the past eroding values of humanism including individualism and diversity;
- Termination of the traditional European humanitarian actions to house and protect political asylum seekers persecuted in their home countries, and refugees fleeing conflict zones, would erode the European leadership in human rights and global governance.

Management of migration and integration of migrants

Forward-looking the distant future allows identifying a number of unfolding trends that matter globally in various dimensions including global demographic and related societal challenges. Obviously, the unfolding trends embedded in demography need to take into account lessons learnt from the past. We know that Europe as a whole, and most EU countries, have badly managed migration in the past 50 years or so. Research shows that immigrants from developing countries are overrepresented among the unemployed and casually employed. Their descendents have higher school failures and dropout rates than the host population, are more often unemployed than their parental generation and the average population, are performing lower socio-economic status jobs, are often badly housed, and show less

upward mobility. They are also more often victims of discrimination, xenophobia and racism.

In general, European countries failed to achieve a successful, secure and sustained integration of migrants from developing countries (e.g. Collinson, 1993; Commission of the European Communities, 2000; Avramov and Cliquet, 2005; Höhn, Avramov, and Kotowska 2008; Avramov, 2012). Slow integration of immigrants and culture-based social segmentation are seen by Avramov as major pitfalls of present day immigration policies. In the light of longer term needs for immigrants and their integration cannot be addressed as “business as usual”.

The first question in policy circles, and among the general public, as rule relates to numbers. Is the presence of large numbers and their high share in the total population, inevitably a problem? It seems that it does not have to be a problem. In the confederal Switzerland, with 3 main language and cultural communities resident foreigners and temporary workers make up about 22 percent of the population. Some 32 percent of its population is with immigration background (for data see Swiss Federal Statistical Office 2008). Of course when looking at the Swiss case, we need to address the composition of the immigrant group, specific characteristics of the immigrants, and the effectiveness of economic, social and cultural integration policies and practices of the host country. We know from the past that the most difficult situation in European countries emerge when high numbers, large ethnic distance and strong inter-group competition coincide.

In the European forward-looking context, in the event of policy development that might favour immigration, assessment of the needs side would have to include assessments of numbers and qualification of immigrants. We would also need to evaluate in a comprehensive way and include also the costs and benefits of migration in longer term view, taking into account not just the short term demand for labour and immediate benefits but also the total cost of the integration process, including the costs of meeting the education, health and housing needs of immigrants and their descendents.

The integration of immigrants debate is by no means conclusive in scientific or policy circles. It is generally useful to distinguish different kinds and degrees of integration of immigrants. Heckmann’s suggestion (2005) remains, in our view, robust. He distinguishes:

- Structural integration: the acquisition of rights and the access to positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society by the immigrants and their descendents;
- Cultural integration: processes of cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitudinal change in individuals;
- Social integration: peoples private relations, group and associational membership;
- Identificational integration: membership in a new society is shown in feelings of belonging and identification.

Integration of immigrants is less about prospects in terms of context-free numbers, and more about types of desired integration and expectations of the host countries and immigrants themselves. Large scale survey in 8 European countries - the Population Policy Acceptance Survey (2000-2003) - looked at expectations towards foreigners and integration of natives and expectations of foreigners. Acceptance of immigrants in Europe study showed that the overwhelming majority of natives in 8 countries studied expect foreigners to make a very strong effort to adapt to the host country (Avramov, 2008). In particular foreigners are expected to master the language and abide by customs and rules of the host country, and immigrants who do not integrate, according to the natives, should return to their own country. The quest for permanence and integration is shared by the overwhelming majority of immigrant women. The FEMAGE project revealed that the majority of migrant women had acquired or had the intention to acquire naturalization in the host country, most felt at home in their host country, and a substantial majority would migrate again to the host country or do not want to return to their country of origin. If they had to make a choice all over again, 7 out of 10 interviewees would migrate again to the host country. It may be concluded that the quest for integration comes from both sides.

Avramov argues (2012) that immigration scenarios need to take into account already present stock of badly integrated immigrants, and people with foreign origin, the general population climate but also the competition at the bottom part of the labour market among the less skilled natives and immigrants, and xenophobia and racism, including racism between old and new immigrant groups.

Migration forward looking ought to include:

- The integration scenarios, as basis for the assessment of the integration capacity of different countries;
- Needs for immigrants according to different sectors of economy and educational attainment, age and family situation;
- Costs and benefits in a longer term perspective.

Revisiting the assumptions about the net inflow of immigrants for labour force purposes over the next few decades ought to be made in the light of integration scenarios addressing different kinds and degrees of integration of immigrants.


Avramov suggests that the quest for immigrants needs to build on scenarios about the capacities to integrate according to different types and levels of integration. The integration scenarios need to take into account different sectors of economy and competences, age and family situation of potential immigrants. They also need to take into account the hidden potential for activating the already present stock of immigrants, and people with foreign origin, and the competition at the bottom segment of the labour market. Only by devising the integration scenarios for “new” and “old” immigrants, we can address in responsible research (Sutcliffe, 2012) needs for immigrants and responsible immigration management.

Growing competition in education worldwide

Europe attaches great importance to the knowledge based economy and tertiary education is considered as a pillar for development and competitiveness. There is a high level of consensus in the European Union that “Europe’s higher education sector should acquire a degree of attractiveness in the wider world equal to Europe’s major cultural and scientific achievements” (European Ministers of Education, 1999). In a longer term perspective a quality higher education system is expected to strengthening Europe’s intellectual, cultural, social, scientific and technological dimensions. One of the immediate expected impacts of co-operation in quality academic and training provisions is to promote citizens’ mobility and employability that contribute to growth and create jobs. Mobility relates both to intra-EU migration and international flows of people. Here again, we may expect that demography continues playing an important role in terms of numbers. Whereas Europe will continue having high proportions of citizens with tertiary education, the weight of the pool of highly skilled people will tilt towards Asia (Figure 6).

The relative advantage of EU having today some 80 percent of the 20-24 year olds in tertiary education, will decrease in 2050. Due to the decrease in size of this age group, the number of students may fall from some 24.3 million today to 21.7 million in 2050. If the remarkable rise in the number of tertiary students in China continues following the trend from 1999 to 2008, China will have more young people in tertiary education that Europe and USA together. Also India, even in the hypothesis of a low increase of its tertiary student population, will overtake the West. All in all, we might need to reflect in Europe not only on which sectors of economy may need immigrants in the next few decades, but above all on enhancing the level but also enlarging the pool of highly educated.

Figure 6: Number of students in tertiary education up to 2050 in major powerhouses in the world



Own projections up to 2050. Data source for past trends of youth in tertiary education UNESCO Institute of Statistics (1999-2012) and for population prospects United Nations Population Division (2011).

Legend:

Europe: Hypothesis: constant at 80 percent of 20-24 year olds.

US: Hypothesis: constant at 80 percent of 20-24 year olds

China: Hypothesis 1: 70 percent of 20-24 year olds will be in tertiary education

Hypothesis 2: 80 percent of 20-24 year olds will be in tertiary education

India: Hypothesis 1: 40 percent of 20-24 year olds will be in tertiary education

Hypothesis 2: 80 percent of 20-24 year olds will be in tertiary education

Enhancing learning mobility is an important objective in the EU in view of increasing Europe's competitiveness and a knowledge-intensive society and deepening the sense of European identity and citizenship within young generations. It is believed that systematic innovation, technical, social, and organisational is embedded in mobility of people in general and youth on the move in particular. Indeed, significant resources are allocated for opening up the learning mobility opportunities to growing numbers of students EU and third country nationals.

In 1987, the year Erasmus was launched, 3244 students spent time studying abroad in one of the 11 countries that initially participated in the Programme. Twenty-five years later, nearly three million students have been abroad for study or training. Erasmus has become not just the best known of all European Union programmes, but the most successful student exchange scheme in the world (European Commission, 2011a).

The EU fellowships programmes implemented since 1990 (FP3) and Marie Curie label since 1996 and under FP7, implemented through People Programme (2007-2013), aimed at structuring training, mobility and career development for researchers. More than 50.000 fellows have benefitted from learning mobility up to date (ibid).

Forward looking dimensions sensitive to policy decisions

As mentioned before, Global Europe 2030-2050 looked at six dimensions sensitive to policy decisions: geopolitics and governance; demographic and societal challenges; territorial and mobility dynamics; economy and technology prospects; energy and natural resources security and efficiency, environment and climate change, and research, education and innovation.

A challenge remains open for migration experts to further address in responsible research the demographic and social implications of migration and integration of immigrants as opposed to much of “business as usual”, fragmented disciplinary and/or vested interest perspectives.

Lessons learnt from the Global Europe 2030-2050 exercise demonstrate that for the EU “business as usual” is not an option. Only “Renaissance” can break with the past solutions to crisis (internal and external). Further, stronger political

integration is required as incremental changes, small adjustments to the current policy framework will not do the job: in order to avoid catastrophic declines, bold, ambitious and coordinated policy actions are required (European Commission, 2012: 142).

Inspiration for choices that must be made regarding global trends, and also targeted migration options may come from the key features of the three Global Europe 2030-2050 scenarios (Table 2).

Table 2: Demographic and societal challenges

<i>Scenario</i>	<i>Key features:</i>
<i>“Nobody cares”</i>	<i>Population ageing and persistent low fertility, increased immigration, constant population</i>
<i>“EU under threats”</i>	<i>Shrinking population, rapid ageing, restricted immigration, increase of economic capital stocks but continued decline of social capital</i>
<i>“EU renaissance”</i>	<i>Standard of living is preserved, active ageing and more “open” society</i>

Reflections about choices to be made regarding possible and desirable future

After 2018, European economies may face considerable shortages in their labour supply. Population ageing in Europe is a strong pressure factor for structural changes to the ways our societies are organized, shaping of the life-course of individuals, and values attached to inter-generational solidarity. In a longer term prospective – up to mid 21st century – demography will be an ever stronger driver for change with more jobs than people in ageing Europe.

Employers will need to be more flexible about how and where people work and how they are rewarded. Widening the talent pool by activating and retaining older workers may become a strategic necessity. Enterprises need to understand this and actively gradually prepare for retaining larger numbers of older workers.

Enterprises will need to adapt their (older) employees’ policies by organizing permanent education and training, and adapt their work environment to the capabilities and aspirations of their workers including facilities for flexibility and variation in work schedules. Enterprises will also need to adapt their products, marketing and sales practices to the expanding pool of elderly consumers.

Activating the inactive and keeping people in work longer years is indispensable (Avramov and Maskova, 2003) but may not be sufficient and more bold policies are required. Migration is an important source for activating a potential pool of talent world wide.

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