Husserl’s Theory of Noematic Sense

Abstract  After Husserl’s transcendental turn and the discovery of the correlation between consciousness and the world the concept of the noema becomes one of the constant leitmotifs of Husserl’s philosophy. My paper will be devoted to the clarification of this concept and its implications for Husserl’s theory of sense. The leading question will be: How can the noema play the role of both the sense and the objective correlate of the intentional act? I will start with presenting the problematic of sense in Husserl’s phenomenology from the Logical Investigations to the Ideas I. The central part of my paper will be devoted to the influential debate regarding the interpretation of the noema. Finally, I intend to point out the most important ways in which the notion of the noema becomes enriched in later Husserl’s philosophy, as well as the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic sense, based on the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. I hope to show that Husserl’s phenomenological theory of sense offers a valuable alternative to the exclusively language-oriented theories of sense.

Keywords: Husserl, noema, sense, correlation, transcendental phenomenology

Introduction

Studying intentionality as the essential characteristic of consciousness is the main task of phenomenology, according to Husserl.1 Moreover, as we become aware in the phenomenological reduction, intentionality is itself a structure composed of noesis and noema – intentional act and its objective correlate. It is through these notions that Husserl in his mature period deals with complex problems of how consciousness bestows sense on objects.

My paper will be devoted to clarifying Husserl’s notion of noema and its implications for his theory of sense. The leading question will be: How can noema play the role of both the sense and the objective correlate of the intentional act? Also, I intend to point out the most important ways in which the notion of the noema becomes enriched, remaining at the same time the constant leitmotif after Husserl’s transcendental turn and the discovery of the correlation between consciousness and the world. In this way I hope to outline the general theory of sense that Husserl’s phenomenology leaves us with as the task for the future.

---

1 This paper is the abridged and reworked version of my Master’s Thesis (“Husserl’s Notion of the Noema: The Phenomenological Theory of Sense”) defended at KU Leuven in January 2016.

Olga Nikolić: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade; hajzentlej@gmail.com
I will start with presenting the problematic of sense in Husserl’s phenomenology and its evolution from his early theory of intentionality of the *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901) to the transcendental phenomenology and the discovery of the phenomenological reduction in the *Ideas I* (1913). These considerations will set the stage for the central part of my paper, devoted to the influential debate regarding the interpretation of the noema. In chapter II, I will present two alternative views on the noema and measure the arguments of both sides against Husserl’s text from *Ideas I*. The questions left open by the debate will lead me to examine the role of non-linguistic, perceptual sense and linguistic, conceptual sense in constituting the identity of the intentional object, as well as the role of context in the constitution of sense. With this aim, in chapter III I will consider later Husserl’s notions of pre-predicative sense and the life-world, as developed in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* and *Crisis of European Sciences*, respectively. I will show how Husserl’s theory of sense in *Ideas* becomes in important ways supplemented by Husserl’s analyses of the inner and outer anticipatory horizons and the life-world as an all-encompassing horizon of all actual and possible objects. In this way, I hope to show that Husserl’s phenomenological theory of sense offers a valuable alternative to the exclusively language-oriented theories of sense.

I The Problematic of Sense in Husserl’s Phenomenology

Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901), the work that marked the breakthrough of phenomenology, appeared in a philosophically turbulent period. Among the most urgent philosophical questions were those of the character of scientific knowledge, the foundation of *a priori* disciplines and the correct delimitation between natural and human sciences. Psychology, understood as a natural science, was increasingly seen as capable of providing the foundation for other sciences, notably for logic and mathematics. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl vigorously criticized logical psychologism for confusing the ideal and necessary laws of logic with the empirical and merely probable psychological judgements about our mental states. Husserl’s initial interest in studying sense derives from his attempt to clarify meanings of logical laws and concepts and thus offer foundations for logic. With this task in mind, Husserl undertakes his investigation into the sense-giving activity of consciousness in general, in line with a concept his teacher Brentano introduced as the defining characteristics of mental phenomena: intentionality.

In his major work, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano argued that psychology could be established as a rigorous science with the task of identifying, classifying and describing mental acts and their essential parts. By means of reflecting on our own mental life we discover that
mental phenomena (i.e. acts of consciousness such as judgments, beliefs, perceptions, wishes, hopes, fears, etc.) are always somehow directed to an object in a certain manner: “In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.” (Brentano 2009: 68) Intentionality is this peculiar directedness of acts of consciousness towards the objects intended in them. Brentano’s theory is often characterized as the object-theory of intentionality, because it apparently explains intentional directedness by introducing a new sort of object with a special ontological status, distinct from objects actually existing outside the mind. Namely, his notion of intentional inexistence of objects in consciousness implies that intentional objects are somehow contained within the acts which intend them, and depend on them for their existence (Brentano 2009: 68).

Brentano’s discovery that all conscious mental processes had to be in some way intentional was Husserl’s main starting point in the development of his own phenomenological approach. However, dissatisfied with Brentano’s explanation of intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence of objects in consciousness, Husserl began to formulate his own view on intentionality, which he would continue to develop and modify for the rest of his life. Criticizing Brentano’s idea that intentional objects are somehow present in consciousness, Husserl insists that “only one thing is present, the intentional experience” and that a relation to an object is achieved solely in virtue of the essential characteristics of this intentional experience itself, regardless of the existence of any intentional object (1984: 386). In other words, components that make an act intentional are immanent to it, but the object itself is transcendent to it. The former Husserl calls ‘intentional content’, and the latter ‘intentional object’.

In the Vth Logical Investigation, Husserl outlines the basic structure of intentionality in terms of the real (reell)³ phenomenological content of intentional experience and the ideal, intentional content, in order to explain how intentional acts refer to their intended objects. For Husserl of the first edition of the Logical Investigations, phenomenology was supposed to describe essential immanent (reell) moments of the conscious experience itself, i.e. the phenomenological content of intentional experience, a study for which any reference to actual (real) intended objects must be completely irrelevant. With this task in mind, Husserl introduced the notion of intentional content: that moment of the phenomenological content comprising

---

2 All references to Husserl’s works cite the Husserliana edition. The translation I used is indicated in bibliography.
3 Husserl uses real to refer to actual worldly relations, things and states of affairs, and reell to refer to the essential immanent component parts of conscious experience: acts and sensuous material.
everything that essentially belongs to the intentional experience as intentional. Husserl disambiguates between several meanings of the notion (Husserl 1984: 413), most important of which for our purpose is intentional content as intentional matter.\(^4\) In his analysis of the immanent content by means of which an act is directed to an object, Husserl makes an essential distinction between the quality and the matter of an act: “the distinction between the general act-character which stamps it as being presentative, emotional, judgmental, etc. and its content which stamps it as presenting this, judging that, etc.” (1984: 425–426) The former is the quality, the latter is the matter of an act. The union of quality and matter of an inten-
tional act is called by Husserl the intentional essence, in opposition to the inessential moments of intentional experience, such as sensuous content.\(^5\)

Intentional matter can be shared by various intentional acts and “is that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not only fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant.” (Husserl 1984: 426) Thus, matter seems to be both the immanent moment of the act and the determination of the object intended in the act. The question imposes itself: what is the ontological status of this peculiar component of phenomenological content which remains identical in many individual acts of consciousness and where exactly does its identity come from? Husserl’s turn away from the object and towards the immanent (reell) make-up of the intentional experience in accounting for intentionality makes it impossible for the identity of intentional matter to be attributed to the identity of the intended object itself (1984: 427). On the other hand, it cannot be explained by the peculiarities of individual acts either, for matter is precisely that in virtue of which particular acts intend the same object in the same determinate manner. The identical intentional matter has explanatory priority over individual acts and their intentions. Husserl’s position on this is best understood if we compare his considerations regarding the meaning-conferring acts constitutive of the meaning of linguistic expressions in the \textit{1st Logical Investigation}: “(...) an expression only refers to an objective correlate because it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or name the object through its meaning. An act of meaning is the determinate manner in which we refer to our object of the moment.” (Husserl 1984: 54) Meaning itself is a determinate logical content, a presentation (concept) of an object or a judgement about a relation, which remains identical in the multiplicity of acts directed to it, i.e. it is an ideal species instantiated in the multiplicity of acts. (Husserl 1984: 102–105). Intentional directedness is thus

\(^4\) The other two are intentional content as intentional object and intentional content as intentional essence.

\(^5\) Sensuous content (e.g. colors, sounds, odors, etc.) is inessential, because it is always changing and is different in every particular act.
explained in virtue of ideal content of an act, mediating between an act and an object that the act intends. Intentional matter is the general name for this sense-component of an act whose identity is that of an ideal species (Husserl 1984: 430). Thus, for Husserl of the Logical Investigations sense is distinguished from object as an ideal entity enabling acts to refer to objects and Husserl treats it according to the model of linguistic meanings. The greatest problem with this view is whether it really explains the intentional directedness of consciousness towards objects, or simply postulates a class of third realm Platonic entities somehow mysteriously related to acts on the one hand and objects on the other hand (Drummond 2002: 36).

Similar structures as just described reappear in Husserl’s mature theory of intentionality, although in a modified form, due primarily to Husserl’s discovery of the phenomenological reduction as the authentic method for doing phenomenology. The way we understand Husserl’s transition from the theory of intentionality offered in the Logical Investigations to the transcendental phenomenology developed during Husserl’s Göttingen years, is crucial for the correct assessment of his theory of sense. Ideas I (1913) marked the transcendental turn in Husserl’s philosophy, introducing Husserl’s theory of the constitution of objects in consciousness and the correlation between consciousness and the world. It is within this new transcendental framework that Husserl advanced the notions of the noema and noesis for the first time in order to account for the fundamental structure of intentionality.

The phenomenological reduction designates a methodological turning away from the actual world of our everyday experience (the world of natural attitude) in which the proper field of phenomenological research becomes revealed. As phenomenologists we abstain from our claims about the outside world, we don’t use any theories that presuppose existence of objects of the outside world. Thus the new phenomenological attitude is opened to us: consciousness loses its empirical sense of something belonging to the world, and gains a new sense of an absolute sphere of ‘immanent’ being. “We have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, ‘constitutes’ within itself, all worldly transcendencies.” (Husserl 1976: 107) Husserl points us towards the study of the pure, absolute, self-contained and world-constituting transcendental consciousness, and to the question of how the world is constituted in consciousness as the central phenomenological problem.

According to Husserl, it is only by performing the reduction that we come to understand the essential intentional correlation of noesis and noema,

---

6 On the ideality of meanings in the Logical Investigations see also Drummond 2002: 35–37 and Rump (web) on the similarity between Husserl’s early theory of sense and Frege’s notion of Sinn.
intentional acts and their objective correlates. Intentional act, the noesis, is ‘the sense-bestowing’ activity of consciousness: “‘To have sense’ or to ‘intend to something’, is the fundamental characteristic of all consciousness which, therefore, is not just any mental living whatever, but is rather a mental living having sense, which is noetic.” (Husserl 1976: 206) Both noetic acts as well as sensuous data (color, touch, tone, pleasure and pain, etc.) that serve as the material for their sense-bestowing activity (Husserl 1976: § 85) belong to the real (\textit{reell}) immanent parts of the stream of consciousness, what Husserl of the \textit{Logical Investigations} called ‘the phenomenological content’. Thus, in the \textit{Logical Investigations}, Husserl was exclusively interested in the noetic side of intentionality, intentional acts with their quality and matter. However, Husserl now recognizes another essential component in the structure of intentionality, namely the noematic component, the non-really inherent (\textit{Irreelles}) moment of intentional experience. Husserl also uses other terms interchangeably with ‘noema’: ‘intended as intended’, ‘intentional Object’ (in inverted commas) and ‘sense’ (Husserl 1976: 203). Still, the noema cannot be outrightly equated with Husserl’s earlier notion of sense as intentional matter, because it is consistently characterized, not as intentional content, but as the objective correlate of the intentional act.

This in turn suggests that what remains left over in the sphere of pure immanence opened up by the phenomenological reduction is not simply a collection of the real (\textit{reell}) components of conscious experience, but the entire intentional correlation between this experience and the object intended in it. On the other hand, designating the noema as the sense of intentional act implies that the noema is in some way abstract and distinct from the ordinary intended objects, even if not in the same way senses of the \textit{Logical Investigations} are. The question arises therefore of how to bring together Husserl’s noticeable shift of interest towards a description of the intentional correlation, rather than noetic description only, with the theory of noemata as senses proposed in the \textit{Ideas I}. Does the introduction of the noesis-noema correlation imply a shift in Husserl’s theory of sense as well?

Immediately after clarifying the distinction between the really inherent and the non-really inherent components of intentional experience, Husserl offers an extremely important exemplary analysis of the perceptual noema in order to distinguish between it and the objects we encounter in the natural attitude. Husserl’s famous example is that of regarding with pleasure a blossoming apple tree in the garden. When we perceive an apple tree in the natural attitude, we see the tree as a material, spatio-temporal object, as a real object in the world. Only in the phenomenological attitude do we become explicitly aware of the noema of the tree. The tree that we experience as real (\textit{real}) in the natural attitude loses its character of reality, or more precisely its reality becomes bracketed and through this bracketing
the noema emerges for us. Even though whilst we are in the phenomenological attitude we don’t posit the actual existence of the tree anymore, still the act of perception remains the act of perceiving something, it still has its objective correlate – its noema. Husserl makes a very clear distinction here between the noema and the object *simpliciter*, which seems to imply an ontological distinction between the two: “The tree *simpliciter* can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense — the sense of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence — cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.” (Husserl 1976: 205) However, at the same time, Husserl points out that even the phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental process is a perceiving of “this blossoming apple tree, in this garden,” so that “everything remains as of old” (1976: 204). What makes the crucial difference is the change in attitude in which the object undergoes a radical modification of sense, allowing us to focus on the ‘perceived as perceived’, the ‘appearing as appearing’, to ‘something given in its essence’: the noema. Whereas it is clear that the object as intended is in fact the object of our intention, it is not completely clear whether in the natural attitude we intend the noema or not. The passage cited above strongly suggests that the noema is an abstract entity which we do not intend in the natural attitude. This poses question as to the relation between the noema and the object *simpliciter*.

Regarding the structure of the noema, Husserl distinguishes between the noematic core, the ‘meant Objectivity as meant’, the ‘pure objective sense’, the ‘noematic What’ on the one hand and, on the other hand, various noematic characteristics (modes of giveness of an objectivity corresponding to the peculiarities of individual acts, e.g. differences in kinds of act, differences in attention, etc.)⁷, all founded upon the central core. Like senses of the *Logical Investigations*, the noematic core is something identical in different intentional acts, all intending the same thing (Husserl 1976: 210–211). E.g. we can perceive, remember, detest or enjoy, the same book. The something identical (the book) in these essentially different acts is the noematic core. Husserl refers to the core component as the sense proper. Nevertheless, not only the core, but the noematic characteristics as well, are essential for the composition of a full, concrete and particular noema of each particular intentional act.

Reflecting back on his earlier one-sidedly noetic approach, Husserl suggests that we should understand noematic core as the noematic correlate of the notion of intentional matter from the *Logical Investigations*.

---

⁷ For example, there is an entire array of essential differences between objects of remembering and perceived objects (making for example the former more doubtful and less precisely presented than the latter). See § 91 of the *Ideas I*. 
Correspondingly, we should understand characteristics as the noematic correlate of intentional quality, and “the full noesis related to the full noe-ma as its intentional and full What” (Husserl 1976: 298).

Further investigation reveals that the core itself has a complex structure. The central noematic moment, also called ‘content’ by Husserl, is the pure X, abstract point of identity which functions as the bearer of changing predicates, also belonging to the noematic core (Husserl 1976: 301).

Sense as the noematic core fixes the identity of the object in the multiplicity of acts in which it is presented. The full noema can also be understood as sense, and each individual act can be regarded as having a concrete, particular sense, but this particular sense is grounded in the identical core-sense.

Unlike the Logical Investigations, where the transcendent objectivity didn’t have a place in the phenomenological investigation at all, Husserl of the Ideas I is interested not only in the essence of the acts and other real component parts of consciousness, but in the essence of their objective correlates as well. On the other hand, the problematic of identity remains of central importance for Husserl’s theory of sense both in the Logical Investigations and the Ideas I. Thus we see that one of the most important questions for Husserl turns out to be how it is the case that we are able to intend the same thing in various intentional acts. The problem of sense for Husserl is essentially related to this question.

I wish to point out several open questions concerning the noema, with which I will deal in the following chapter. 1. How should we interpret the enigmatic relationship between the noema and the intended object, whereby everything remains the same, yet becomes radically different? 2. How should we understand the identification of the noema both with sense and with the objective correlate of the act? 3. Finally, how are we to account for the identity of the noematic sense throughout various intentional experiences?

In the next chapter we will investigate how these questions were answered by the two opposed interpretations of the noema. In confronting and comparing the arguments, I hope the clear answer will emerge.

II The Noema Debate

In this chapter I want to focus on the debate revolving around the interpretation of the noema, which represents two opposing views on the noema and consequently two opposing views on intentionality. One of the main motives behind the debate is to understand how the noema is the sense of intentional act. With respect to this, two of the most important questions are 1. What is the ontological status of the noema? 2. What is
the role of the noema in intentionality? One side of the debate (sometimes called ‘West Coast’, or Fregean interpretation), inspired by Føllesdal, with Dreyfus, Smith and McIntyre as prominent figures, claims that the noema for Husserl is a new sort of object: an intentional object, ontologically distinct from the intended object, whose role is to mediate the relationship between acts of consciousness and their intended objects. For example, according to this view, if I am perceiving a table, there are three elements in play, (1) the noetic element: my act of perception, (2) the intended object: the table itself which I am looking at (3) the noema, which is the sense of the table, by means of which our consciousness is intentionally directed to the table itself. The other side of the debate, whose main proponents are Aaron Gurwitsch, John Drummond and Robert Sokolowski (sometimes called the ‘East Coast’ interpretation), claims that the noema is in some way identical to the intended object, that there is no ontological difference between the object of intention and the noema, and that intentionality has two elements – an act and an object, without a third mediating element.

I will begin the exposition of the debate with the Fregean interpretation, and then move on to the ‘East Coast’ interpretation.

A. The Fregean Interpretation

Føllesdal begins his influential paper “Husserl’s Notion of the Noema” with Brentano’s theory of intentionality and his unsatisfactory solution to the problem of non-existent intentional objects (e.g. centaurs, golden mountain, etc.). Namely, Brentano solves the problem by arguing that all intentional objects are immanent to consciousness, even if they do not exist in the real world. But then what about really existent objects of intention? The undesired consequence of such object-theory of intentionality is that it reduces even the really existent objects to the immanent content of consciousness.

According to Føllesdal, Husserl’s theory of intentionality solves this problem by strictly separating consciousness from its intended objects and introducing a third entity, the noema. “When we think of a centaur, our act of thinking has a noema, but it has no object; there exists no object of which we think. Because of its noema, however, even such an act is directed. To be directed simply is to have a noema.” (Føllesdal 1969: 681)

Føllesdal (1969) puts forward 12 theses on the noema, the most important of which are:

Thesis (1): “The noema is an intensional entity, a generalization of the notion of meaning (Sinn, Bedeutung).” (681)

Thesis (3), stating that the noematic Sinn mediates the relation between consciousness and the object (682).
Thesis (4): “The noema of an act is not the object of the act (i.e., the object toward which the act is directed).” (682)

Thesis (8), stating that noemata are abstract entities, i.e. that they are non-real, non-spatial and non-temporal. As the textual support, Føllesdal refers to the previously mentioned distinction in Ideas I between the noema and the object simpliciter. (684)

Thesis (12), stating that the noema consists of two components, a complex conceptual pattern of determinations that makes sensuous data be the appearance of one identical object on the one hand, and various noematic characteristics on the other hand. (687)

If noema is a mediator, how are we to understand such mediation? According to this interpretation, in a way similar to Fregean senses.

We should note that an analogous dilemma to the one Føllesdal found in Brentano and Husserl, exists in the analytic tradition. It concerns the question of how we can have meaningful expressions about non-existent objects. This is the problem that Frege tried to solve in his classical paper “On Sense and Meaning”. The paper was written in 1892, a short time before the publication of the Logical Investigations. Its main topic is the problem of non-trivial statements of identity. Namely, Frege asks how we are to account for the fact that when we state the identity ‘a=a’ this is trivially true in virtue of a priori laws of logic, but when we state the identity ‘a=b’ this is a non-trivial a posteriori truth that can have added cognitive value.

His answer is that “a difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of the thing designated.” (Frege 1984: 158) According to Frege, a mode of presentation is the sense through which the thing is presented by a particular sign. Thus, besides having reference, signs (e.g. names) also have a sense. This allowed Frege to claim that sentences that refer to non-existent object can still be meaningful, because even though they don’t have a referent, they still have a sense.

Sinn is objective and non-mental, strictly distinguished from ideas, which are merely subjective. We cannot share ideas, but we can share Sinn. Sense is not in the head, but neither is it somewhere in the external world. Rather it belongs in the third Platonic realm. Thus, for Frege senses are ideal, non-spatiotemporal, ontologically distinct entities that mediate the relationship between a name, a concept, or a proposition and its referent (Frege 1984: 160–161).

Returning to Føllesdal, we can now sum up his position in the following way: the noema is not a real object, but it is not a component of the intentional act either, so it must be something else, an abstract entity mediating
the relation between the act and the object. Furthermore it is ontologically very similar to Fregean senses, as an ideal content of consciousness (an intensional entity). In addition, Husserl can explain how intentional acts can intend non-existent objects in the same way Frege does: because the noema enables acts to refer to objects, thus giving them their intentional character, an act does not need to intend a real object in order to be intentional. Because of these similarities, noemata are probably in important ways analogous to linguistic meanings.

This position was subsequently developed in greater detail by Føllesdal’s students, Smith and McIntyre. Going back to Husserl’s early theory of intentionality, Smith and McIntyre see Husserl as offering a ‘content’ theory as opposed to the object theory in order to explain “how the content of an experience can succeed in relating it to an entity of some ordinary sort, such as a physical object.” (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 15) They stress that intentionality for Husserl is not to be explained by some peculiarity of intentional objects, as if these were some special sort of objects, unlike objects of our everyday experience. On the contrary: “Husserl’s view is that the intentionality of an act is determined by the act’s own intrinsic character, and for this reason it does not depend on what is actually true of the intended object or even its existence.” (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 92) Since acts have intentionality independently of the existence of their intended objects, the directedness of consciousness should be explained in virtue of the internal structure of the act itself. Accordingly, Smith and McIntyre understand the phenomenological reduction as an ‘inward turn’, away from the intended objects, in which this internal structure of intentional experience is revealed. This reminds us of the early Husserl’s theory of sense, in which intentional matter, an essential moment of the internal structure of intentional acts, played the role of directing them towards their intended objects.

Indeed, one of the important claims Smith and McIntyre defend, on which legitimacy of their interpretation depends, is that the noematic sense is the mature version of Husserl’s notion of intentional matter from the *Logical Investigations*. Like intentional matter, the noematic sense is an ideal meaning-component of the act. The major change they see in Husserl’s theory of intentional content is that this meaning-component is no longer considered to be an essence instantiated in the multiplicity of individual acts, but an abstract particular entertained by the act:

“In *Ideas*, however, noemata are not act-essences, or universals, but abstract entities of a different sort. As we shall see later, Husserl’s description of the inner structure of the specific Sinn-component of the noema seems to indicate that Sinne are a kind of abstract particulars; in particular, the Sinn of a direct object act is quite like the sense of a definite description on a Fregean theory of meaning.” (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 124)
Like Føllesdal, Smith and McIntyre conceive of the relation between the intended object and the noema in analogy with the way linguistic meanings prescribe objects to which they refer. According to them, every linguistic meaning is a noematic Sinn expressed and every noematic Sinn is in principle expressible and therefore a linguistic meaning (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 182–184). From this they draw the conclusion that noemata are in fact identical with the meanings of linguistic expressions and that when expressed in language they mediate the relation of words and referents in the manner of Fregean senses. The way a noematic sense, i.e. the determinable X and its predicates, determines an object can therefore be understood by comparing its structure with the structure of linguistic meanings. Smith and McIntyre find it most suitable to explain X as prescribing the object in the manner of direct reference, similar to the meaning of demonstratives such as ‘this’ and ‘that’, and the predicates as prescribing properties that the object is intended as having (1982: 213–214). However, the meaning of demonstratives is determined by the context of the utterance, and the Sinn of perception by the physical context of perception. According to Smith and McIntyre, Husserl cannot account for this contextual factor involved in intentionality because his notion of sense is limited only to the “abstract and eternal noematic content” of experience (1982: 216 – 219).

B. The East Coast Interpretation: John Drummond

The East Coast interpretation opposes the view defended by the Fregeans, that the noema has a mediating role between consciousness and its intended object. In discussing the East Coast interpretation I chose to focus on Drummond’s book Noema and Object: Husserlian Intentionality and Non-foundational Realism. I believe Drummond’s work to be representative of this side of the debate, because it comprehensively and uncompromisingly confronts the Fregean position on all the important points of the debate.

The argumentative line of this interpretation is centered on the claim that the noema is the phenomenologically reduced object, or in Drummond’s words: “The reduction merely changes the attitude with which we focus presumptively existent objects – rather than focusing some hidden class of intensional entities.” (Drummond 1990: 7) Noema is the object itself, modified by the phenomenological reduction. Drummond claims that Husserl defends a radically new version of the object theory of intentionality and that there is no ontological difference between intended and intentional objects. He supports his claim by several arguments.

First of all, the Fregean interpretation of the noema is motivated by the early Husserlian view of meaning and by the similarities of this view with Frege’s.
theory of sense and reference. However we are not justified in transposing without reservations the views of early Husserl to the views of mature Husserl, because Husserl significantly changed his view by the publication of *Ideas I*. Drummond does not deny that Husserl's theory of the noema is an assimilation of his earlier theory of intentional content. However, he argues against the Fregeans that Husserl of the *Ideas I* introduced the intentional object in the sphere of phenomenological research. This allowed him to make the intentional object itself the bearer of identity in his explanation of how a multiplicity of acts can share an identical sense, the role previously played by the ideal intentional matter (Drummond 1990: 41–42).

Namely, Husserl consistently identifies the noema both with the intended object as intended and with the sense of intentional act. We should remind ourselves that precisely in those passages where Husserl distinguishes between the real object and the noema, he claims that even the phenomenologically reduced mental process is the perceiving of this apple tree with all the same characteristics as in the natural attitude. Everything remains the same only modified. “The inverted commas surrounding 'lovely' and ‘attractive’ within this text call upon us to consider these expressions as denoting sense-elements within the noema, but Husserl’s language clearly suggests that sense-elements are in some manner the Objective properties themselves considered only insofar as they appear within this perception or act of liking.” (Drummond 1990: 117) Fregean interpretation runs into problems in explaining Husserl’s identification of sense and object in *Ideas I*. Fregeans simply argue that Husserl uses a misleading terminology. (Drummond 1990: 114, Smith and McIntyre 1984: 176) Drummond on the other hand, thinks that this identification indicates an important change in Husserl’s theory of sense. This change can only be correctly appreciated if we grasp the sense of Husserl’s transcendental turn and the true novelty of the phenomenological reduction.

By bracketing the existence of an object we can recognize the object as something belonging inseparably to the essence of this experience. That is also how the noema is distinct from the object *simpliciter*: it is the intended object, viewed in the phenomenological attitude, with respect to its essential correlation with consciousness. We don’t have to make an ontological distinction between noemata and objects in order to understand the abstract character of noemata. The noema is abstractly considered object, object considered in the phenomenological reduction, as the correlate of experience and apart from our positing or negating of its existence within the natural attitude.9

---

9 Consider also Drummond’s critique of the notion of abstract particular in Drummond 1992: 89–110.
However, Husserl does claim that the object is given in or through the sense. In order to explain why, Drummond appeals to Husserl’s use of the notion of ‘noematic intentionality’, as distinguished from the noetic one. Husserl mentions noematic intentionality in several places when he discusses the noemata which have multiplicity of strata founded one on another. Noetic intentionality, Husserl says, ”goes clear through the line of noematic intentionality.” Also: “The Ego's regard goes straight through the noemata of the sequence of levels, until it arrives at the Object of the ultimate level beyond which it cannot go, but upon which, instead, it fixes.” (Husserl 1976: § 101) When Husserl mentions givenness of the object through sense he speaks in the context of the structure of the noema, and especially with respect to the relation of the full noema and its innermost moment: the pure determinable X. The noematic sense itself includes a reference to its most fundamental noematic component. Husserl does not speak here of an abstract noema being directed to an external object (Drummond 1990: 135–138).

According to Drummond the sense of the act for Husserl is the object itself as it is given in the act. The sense of a particular concrete act then would be the full, concrete noema, complex acts would have layers of sense, composed of many objectivities all united in one identical object. Also, we can view noemata in abstraction from the kind of act in which they are presented: this is when we regard the noematic core which can be identical in different acts, so that we can say that these acts all intend the same object. In conclusion, Drummond describes sense as the significance of the object for consciousness. “The noema, therefore, is the intended objectivity just as intended with all its significance for us, in its relation to our animating interests and concerns, but apart from our participation in the general belief characteristic of the natural attitude, i.e. apart from the naïve acceptance of the factual existence of these objectivities and the validity of our judgments and evaluations thereof.” (Drummond 1990: 106)

C. What is the Noema?

The main support in favor of the Fregean interpretation is to be found in Husserl’s separation of the noema and the intended object in § 88 of Ideas I. Together with the fact that an act can intend a non-existent entity, and the similarity in the structure of the noema and that of the intentional essence of the Logical Investigations (Husserl himself compares sense-core and noematic characteristics with matter and quality of the Investigations), this leads Fregeans to conclude that the noema is an abstract, ideal entity,

---

10 “The noema in itself has an objective relation and, more particularly, by virtue of its own ‘sense.’” (Husserl 1976: 296) “Each noema has a “content” that is to say, its “sense,” and is related through it to ‘its’ object.” (Husserl 1976: 297)
ontologically distinct from the thing intended, mediating between act and object, thus making intentional directedness possible.

Drummond replied by stressing the role of the phenomenological reduction – the change of attitude that makes it possible to grasp the object as the noema: the objective correlate of the act. Textual evidence in favor of Drummond’s view is also pretty strong. Husserl frequently calls the noema ‘intended object as intended’, object put in inverted commas, in parentheses, and consistently contrasts the object simpliciter in an unmodified sense with the noema as the object modified by the phenomenological reduction. All this points to the understanding of the noema as the phenomenologically reduced object.11

In my opinion, Drummond’s interpretation has more credibility for several reasons.

First, it is misguided to suppose that shortcomings in Brentano’s explanation of how non-real objects are intended led Husserl to introduce a new entity. I don’t think that Husserl’s motivation for introducing the noema is an attempt to account for the cases where there is no real object of intention. Husserl has no problem stating that we can grasp non-real objects, i.e. essences we grasp in eidetic intuition, numbers in corresponding arithmetical attitude, we have phantasized objects as objects of phantasying act, and so on. Husserl even states that an object is always somehow posited, even when its existence is negated (1976: 244). Husserl’s task is to carefully describe how each kind of object is given in its corresponding kind of act. This suggests that Husserl has a very different approach to the problem of intentionality than the one posed in the analytic tradition, of how to explain meaning of expressions without referent. For Husserl there are no intentional acts without objects. Therefore, it is a mistake to claim that, according to Husserl, “when we think of a centaur, our act of thinking has a noema but it has no object”. I believe that it would be more in line with Husserl’s view to say that the object of intention in this case is a centaur, posited in the particular act of imagining. But the same centaur is the noema of this act, when viewed with respect to the essential correlation between the act and the object. Fregeans are struggling to understand what it means to disregard the existence of objects, for they think that this must automatically lead us inward, to a consciousness without objects. In a sense they are demonstrating how difficult it can be to abandon the natural attitude, for instead of disregarding the existence and non-existence of objects they are arguing from the non-existence of objects that the structure of intentional experience must involve some sort of abstract

---

11 One of the clearest formulations in favor of this interpretation can be found in § 97 of the Ideas I.
mediating sense. But the point is to phenomenologically describe the differences we encounter when we intend something existent and when we intend something non-existent, as well as when something we intended as existent becomes doubtful, confirmed, etc. or vice versa when something we intended as non-existent turns out to be existent after all. Although Husserl attempted to explain intentional directedness solely in virtue of really inherent moments of intentional acts in the *Logical Investigations*, later he moved towards a theory that stresses the correlation of the act and object. Thus I agree with Sokolowski when he says: “Smith and McIntyre want to use the noema as a device that would explain how consciousness becomes intentional. But Husserl’s philosophy is not explanatory in this way; it does not provide devices, it merely describes.” (1987: 527)

We see how by relying too much on the *Logical Investigations* Fregeans risk to neglect or misinterpret the role of the phenomenological reduction in understanding the notion of the noema. Smith and McIntyre argue that the *epoché* brackets the existence of objects, which is correct, but they continue to claim that Husserl made a turn inward in which only the content that belongs to consciousness is revealed. Consequently they interpret Husserl as an internalist, interested only in the structure of acts of consciousness, independently of their intended objects. This interpretation does not square well with the transcendental turn. Fregean interpretation fails to appreciate the entire moment of the correlation between consciousness and object, whereby the world, although bracketed, remains as a pure phenomenon for consciousness. We don’t turn away from the world in order to reveal something that has nothing to do with it, we are performing the *epoché* precisely in order to see that the world of our everyday natural attitude is constituted in the transcendental consciousness.

Finally, I don’t agree with the linguistic interpretation offered by Smith and McIntyre, for two reasons. First, I don’t think it has confirmation in the text of *Ideas I*. The expressibility thesis, as Drummond also points out (1990: 189–191) does not imply that noemata are ontologically identical entities with linguistic meanings. Rather it simply means that the same object intended in a non-expressive act can become an object of a new, expressive act. This can even indicate that objective senses of non-expressive acts serve as grounds for the meanings of linguistic expressions, for we need first to have an object in an act of intuition in order to be able to formulate a concept and express it in language. Second, I don’t think that anything is accomplished if we explain the noema by reducing it to Fregean senses, because what remains is an equally mysterious third realm. This does not really explain even linguistic meanings. In other words, we are back to the problems *Investigations* left us with. Fregean interpretation, with the noema as an abstract particular, does not solve this problem. It leaves us in
the dark equally as Husserl’s early theory as to the nature of the relation between the noema and the act. It is different from the Investigations only because now senses are in some other unexplained way related to the act, not as essences, but as correlates. In the following chapter I will attempt to outline what I believe to be Husserl’s alternative to the exclusively linguistic theory of sense, the one that regards sense as a general phenomenon, but that nevertheless includes linguistic sense under its scope.

What is the noema? The time has come to answer the three questions posed at the end of chapter I:

1. Regarding the relationship between the noema and the intended object I agree with Drummond that the noema is the intended object itself when we regard it, not simply ‘taking it for granted’ the way we do in everyday natural attitude, but in the phenomenological attitude, i.e. when we pay attention to the object as intended in the act.

2. The noema is the meaningful object constituted in the activity of consciousness, in its endeavor to make sense of the world. The objects we encounter are meaningful in virtue of us giving them the sense they have for us. Sense is a constitutive element of objects themselves, but all objects are always objects for consciousness. The objects in the world can have various senses for various subjects and with respect to various intentions. For example, they can have practical sense if they can be used to achieve practical goals, or theoretical sense when we are using them to build theories. Fundamentally, things always have sense of identical objects of our many intentions. If it weren’t for sense-bestowing acts that constitute them as identical, things wouldn’t have sense of things anymore.

3. However, the question of the constitution of this identical noematic core remains open in the Ideas I. I am picking up on this question in the following chapter in the context of the later Husserl’s analyses of sense-constitution. At the same time, we will see that this question is in an important way linked to the question of the relation between the non-linguistic perceptual sense and the linguistic, conceptual sense. Are we supposed to understand the perceptual noemata and sense-bestowing acts as the ‘labor of the concept’, such is Føllesdal’s pattern of determinations or demonstrative reference coupled with predicates, as Smith and McIntyre suggested, or is the perceptual experience essentially different from the activity of determining objects by means of concepts?

The change in Husserl’s approach to intentionality is usually described as his development from static (Ideas I), to genetic (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses, Formal and Transcendental Logic) and finally generative phenomenology (Crisis). After the Ideas I the phenomenological
reduction led Husserl to study the origins of sense at a passive, pre-cognitive and pre-predicative level of consciousness and the manner in which sense-bestowing activities of consciousness are grounded in the surrounding life-world. Following this trail will also allow me to respond to the previously mentioned critique of Husserl for his alleged failure to take into account contextual factors in accounting for intentionality. We will see that Husserl’s phenomenology gives us a useful theoretical tool to study the contextual dimension of sense.

III Linguistic and Non-linguistic Sense

In the 1920s Husserl held series of lectures on transcendental logic, widely known as the lectures on passive synthesis. These lectures mark Husserl’s development from static to genetic analyses of consciousness and anticipate his late generative phenomenology (Steinbock 2001: xvi). Throughout the lectures Husserl devotes special attention to the passive syntheses in perception as constitutive of the fundamental sphere of pre-giveness: a necessary foundation for all the higher acts of consciousness.

When perceiving an external, spatio-temporal object, we always see the object only from one side. However, even though the whole spatio-temporal object is not given genuinely in the present perception, other sides are always emptily co-intended with the side that is genuinely perceived, so that the full thing, not just a side of it, is the objective correlate of our perception:

“Noetically speaking, perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting that presents in an intuitive manner what is originally exhibited, and of an empty indicating that refers to possible new perceptions. In a noematic regard, what is perceived is given in adumbrations in such a way that a particular giveness refers to something else that is not given, as what is not given belonging to the same object.” (Husserl 1966: 5)

External perception is not simply an originarily presentive act, it essentially includes empty, indeterminate anticipatory intentions, which nevertheless “prescribe a rule for the transition to new actualizing appearances.” (Husserl 1966: 6) The full perceptual noema is not simply the thing that we perceive in the present moment. Of necessity, the latter must fit in with the possibilities of sense prescribed by its inner and outer anticipatory horizons: constantly changing patterns of possible new determinations of the thing, as well as of its relations to other things, in which it is more or less vaguely predetermined which appearances can function as further determinations of the thing, and which cannot. Because our perceptual experience is essentially incomplete, perceptual object (perceptual noema) is never a fixed, stable unity – it always has horizons of possible new senses.
Explanation of intentional structure of external perception and the role of intentional horizons in it requires temporal analysis. Horizons are the work of a constant process of anticipating intentions, always directed towards a system of new, not yet determined moments of a given object. At the same time, horizons anticipate what can appear in the surrounding background of the momentarily intended object. Sense becomes fulfilled in time, and empty inner and outer horizons point to what can be integrated concordantly in the progressive fulfillment of sense. Along with the anticipation continuous retention is at work, so that previously fulfilled intentions are retained in the present one as well. In other words, in passing over to a new perception of an object, we don’t forget what we earlier perceived. Perception is a flux, extended in time, “where appearances concordantly pass into one another and form the unity of coincidence corresponding to the unity of sense.” (Husserl 1966: 8)

But there is also the possibility of a break in this series of fulfilling acts. Such ‘disappointment’ occurs when our anticipations unexpectedly fail, i.e. when a new appearance of an object does not fit in with its pre-determined horizons of sense. Occurrence of disappointment further determines the sense of the entire object, since the new, non-anticipated determination becomes integrated in the totality of the sense of the object (Husserl 1966: 26). Anticipatory horizons of perception related to this object are accordingly modified and the sense of the whole is ‘reinterpreted’ on a passive level so as to conform to the new occurrence. Thus even the horizons themselves are temporally constituted in the course of experience.

The perceptual horizons are not concept-like patterns of determinations, however. They are much more fluid and indeterminate. Only later some of these passively intended and rather vague determinations become conceptually fixed. The ideal and linguistically expressible conceptual senses constituted in the higher level acts, such is judgement, also play crucial role in the constitution of objective sense. Even though conceptual senses are made possible on the basis of fluid acts of constitution on the perceptual level, it is these that really enable us to recognize identical objects in the multiplicity of appearances. As Sokolowski explains:

“A fixed sense which has the consistency and solidity to reappear in different acts as the same ideal entity appears for the first time in judgment. We might say that “concepts” arise only in judgments. Before the categorical act of judging takes place, there are only the fluid anticipations of meaning or sense, but such anticipations are not the same as fixed senses. They are only the “lived” pre-conceptual or pre-categorical foreshadowing of the type of object we call a sense, and they can be understood only teleologically, that is, in function of the terminal sense they anticipate. There is no crystallized meaning in pre-predicative encounter.” (1970: 172)
I slightly depart from this explanation of the relation between the perceptual and the conceptual dimensions of experience, in that I find that perceptual experience already relates us to the perceived object in a meaningful way, even if we still have no concept of it. The perceptual noema is already a meaningful object. Its identity is fluid, but the sense-bestowing activity of anticipation and retention has already begun. On the other hand, admitting that only concepts can give us fixed identical senses is not a return to the mediator theory, because the relation between perceptual object and intentional act is not necessarily mediated by a concept enabling an act to refer to its object. Even if the concepts are actually incorporated in our perceptual experience, which is often the case (e.g. we perceive houses, dogs, cats, etc. without having to go through the entire process of constitution of concepts for each individual house, dog or cat), the perceptual sense includes much more than the concept prescribes. The entire perceived object with its ever changing inner and outer horizons of sense is the full noematic correlate of the perceptual act.

Unlike the noema of the Ideas I, the objective sense is now understood as becoming constituted in time. Husserl replaces the static analysis of essential structures with the dynamic analysis of the very process of sense-constitution. This change however should be understood as building upon previous grounds, where previous results are further explored, rather than rejected.

In response to the analysis of the intentionality of perception offered by Smith and McIntyre, we can bring ourselves to see that for Husserl perception does not refer in the manner of an empty demonstrative ‘this’. It intends its object by ‘articulating’ content given in the perceptual experience, according to the laws of the passive temporal and associative synthesis. Perceptual sense is also not to be equated with conceptual sense. Although conceptual sense is the sense in the pregnant meaning of the term, the identical unity in the multiplicity of acts, perceptual sense constitutes the ground for the conceptual sense. Our activity of conceptual determining, of attributing concepts to things, runs parallel with a different and more original mode of experience, that of immediate intuition. Husserl’s considerations aim to show that we have a pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic recognition of objects around us on the basis of passive synthesis, an intentionality that unifies, distinguishes, associates, determines, recognizes, retains and anticipates without us being explicitly conscious of it.

Finally, in response to the critique by Smith and McIntyre, arguing that Husserl cannot account for the contextual element of intentionality, I wish to briefly point out another important moment in the constitution of sense, the one Husserl explores in his latest work, The Crisis of European sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. The sense-bestowing, noetic activity is multifarious, not only because there is an immense plurality of ways in...
which subjective consciousness can have objects for itself, but also because it is the matter of intersubjective constitution of sense in the pre-given life-world, the world of everyday life and praxis. Objects are meaningful even when we don’t pay attention to the correlation at all, when we are simply engaged with them. Their sense is partly pre-given, for we are born into the already meaningful world, and we appropriate the network of senses already constituted in our community. Every sense of a particular thing, every sense-bestowing activity of particular acts of consciousness are made possible only against the background of already pre-given horizon of possible senses that is the life-world. Each of us is a transcendental ego, constituting the world, each of us has the multiplicity of horizons of various worldly objects, all grounded in the totality of the one world-horizon. In living together, our horizons overlap, mutually support and correct each other. The world in which we live is therefore the correlate of the transcendental intersubjectivity (Husserl 1962: 171).

After everything that has been said so far, I don’t think I should dwell on this point for too long: study of inner and outer horizons as well as the study of the life-world is the study of context. Partial horizons and the unifying horizon of the world as a whole provide a constant orientation for our meaningful activities. The study of context can be applied in all the fields with which we are meaningfully engaged, in order to disclose the hidden presuppositions that enable this particular domain to acquire its sense. Once again we see how inappropriate it is to reduce horizons of meaningfulness to conceptual patterns, or sets of possible descriptions of object. The possibility of these descriptions and conceptualizations is itself grounded in the life of consciousness, in the sedimented past experience, as well as in the anticipation of further experiences, whose dynamic interplay constitutes the all-encompassing, changing horizon of the world.

**Conclusion**

From the early beginnings in the *Logical Investigations* to his latest works, the central concern of Husserl’s phenomenology is the theory of sense. Husserl made a long way from his original theory of senses as ideal meanings instantiated in intentional acts. The transcendental turn and the phenomenological description of the essential correlation between consciousness and object opened the possibility of a more general, more fundamental theory of sense than the study of linguistic meanings could ever offer. Husserl kept enriching his transcendental-phenomenological theory of sense to include a theory of sense-constitution on the pre-predicative level of perception, the role of the anticipatory horizons in providing framework for all meaningful encounters of consciousness and the world and the life-world as the most general horizon of sense. Husserl’s phenomenology sets before
us a theoretical task to develop further a theory of sense that would be more encompassing than the linguistic theory of meaning, but that would on the other hand also take into account the essentially linguistic dimension of our experience.

Language has great importance in the constitution of sense. Indeed, regarding the general question ‘how words mean something?’ fruitful encounters are possible between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, which undoubtedly makes great progress in various domains of language analysis. However, as I tried to show, the sense should not be understood solely as the meaning of words and sentences, nor exclusively as the accomplishment of consciousness that thinks with concepts. I would like to suggest that Husserl's decisive contribution to the theory of sense is to be found in the focus he places on the study of sense as it is constituted in all the multifarious interrelations of consciousness and the world, which go far beyond the linguistic phenomena. For example, the sense of a certain monument for a certain local community is constituted in that community with respect to the sense of a historical event that the monument marks, in the horizon of the past in which this event played a significant role in their common life-world (as a triumph, a tragedy, a beginning of a revolution, etc). The sense somebody’s letter has for me extends beyond the meaning of words and sentences written in it, encompassing my relationship with that person whether it is a long-lost relative, a friend sending me a postcard, or simply somebody advertising his products to me. In everyday life we constantly encounter meaningful things and engage in meaningful activities. We could say, our lives are constantly meaningful in virtue of us constituting it as such, even if for the most part we are not even aware of this constant sense-bestowing activity. The most general question of the theory of sense inspired by Husserl's phenomenology is: what makes it possible for us to enter in all these meaningful relations with the world around us? This can include various particular studies of what makes it possible for us to recognize particular types of things in the world with the particular types of sense they have, use them for various activities, feel something about them, set goals for ourselves or with others, etc. Included within this general theory of sense are also the problems I discussed in the previous chapter with respect to the perceptual sense of the objects, how it makes possible the conceptual sense and how, on the other hand, the perception itself takes over the conceptual content. Also, Husserl's phenomenological theory of sense opens the possibility to study the sense of historical processes, intricate changes in the way we relate to things in the world and other human beings in the course of our lives and in the course of generations. We should also mention the phenomenological study of the sense of scientific concepts and methods by explicating their ground in the activities of the life-world and our lived experience.
Whenever we ask about sense in the manner indicated above, whichever particular investigation we choose to engage into (needless to say, those indicated above do not comprise the full list), we should ask about subject for which an object has such-and-such a sense and how this sense becomes constituted for the subject. In the *Ideen* I Husserl made a breakthrough from the theory of meanings as mediators towards a general study of sense. The decisive step enabling Husserl to do this was his theory of the correlation between intentional acts (noeses) and their intended objects (noemata). The lesson I think we should learn from Husserl’s phenomenology is that the category of sense should be kept separated from that of linguistic meaning. *Sinn* should be understood as something different from *Bedeutung*, because we can truly understand *Bedeutung* only on the basis of the more general study of *Sinn*.

**Bibliography**


Olga Nikolić

Huserlova teorija noematičkog smisla

Apstrakt


Ključne reči: Huserl, noema, smisao, korelacija, transcendentalna fenomenologija.