A WASTED OPPORTUNITY

 

It was just recently that I became aware of Laura Secor’s article “Testaments Betrayed–Yugoslavian Intellectuals and the Road to War” (September issue of Lingua Franca) in which she accuses me of (“open”) Serbian nationalism. Ms Secor does not even try to explain what she means by nationalism, as if it were not a highly contested term. Instead of a lengthy letter I am attaching my text “Nation, Nationalism and Citizenism”-which I hope will provoke a serious discussion on the topic in your journal.  In what follows, I will briefly touch upon only some issues in Ms Secor’s account.

                Ms Secor seems to have been in a great hurry to publish the article, given that of all the people interviewed and quoted in the article, not a single one was from the Belgrade “Praxis” group she writes about.  So much for her post-modernist perspectivism, not to mention modernist fairness and objectivity.

Ms Secor suggests that it was only in 1997 that I began condemning Serbian atrocities as well, namely in my book “The Fall of Yugoslavia–Why Communism Failed.”  Fact 1: The book she mentions is the English translation of the Serbo-Croatian original published in 1995 (and submitted for publishing a year earlier).  Fact 2: Assuming Ms Secor does not read Serbo-Croatian, she could have consulted my text published in 1995 in the special issue of the Fordham International Law Journal entitled “The Destruction of Yugoslavia.” Fact 3: I have also published dozens of articles and gave numerous interviews prior to 1995. Ms Secor chose to ignore these. Why?  (By the way, Ms Secor’s inability to read Serbo-Croatian does not absolve her from responsibility for factual mistakes such as claiming that Serbs constituted a majority in the former Yugoslavia, which they never did.)

Since Ms Secor focuses on my being the main advisor to the former President of FRY Dobrica Cosic, the following are some basic facts about it. Fact 1: In June of 1992 he became President of what remained of Yugoslavia. Four weeks later, with his support, an American businessman of Serbian origin, Milan Panic, became Prime Minister. Although Cosic’s constitutional power was ceremonial and Panic’s dominant one, Ms Secor does not even mention Panic and the fact that those two worked in concert against Slobodan Milosevic. Why? Fact 2: In the autumn of 1992, I conveyed Cosic’s message to the U.S. government  (through the former U. S. ambassador in Belgrade, John Skenlon) in which he expresses a desire for the immediate improvement of the relations between the two countries and the inclusion of FRY into NATO.  Though the message was positively received the answer we received was that it was unfortunately too early for such steps to be taken.  I made public those facts in the Belgrade opposition press in 1996. Further, the opposition Democratic Party, openly supported by Cosic and Panic, asked me to be their MP candidate for the federal elections in December of 1992 but I was not elected. Slobodan Milosevic, then President of Serbia, sabotaged the efforts of Cosic and Panic to promote peace, democratize the country, create conditions for a market economy and improve relations with the West. In January 1993, with the help of the Serbian ultra-nationalist Vojislav Seselj, Milosevic succeeded in removing Panic and four months later Cosic as well. I resigned and returned to my position in the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (IPST), Belgrade, and to teaching at the University of Kansas, U.S.

Ms Secor calls me a nationalist. I bet this would come as a surprise to Mr. Milan Panic and his former anti-Milosevic and anti-nationalist government ministers I closely cooperated with: Varadi, Ivic, Grubac, Djukic, Perisic. The same could be said of the presidents of the leading opposition democratic parties who are even now senior research fellows in IPST where I am the director: Pesic, Micunovic, Djindjic, Kostunica? Finally, Ms Secor should also check her characterization of me with notorious Vojislav Seselj, who has repeatedly publicly called me “a Western agent”.

                Ms Secor claims I have not been politically active since the removal of Cosic.  Fact 1: I stated my positions in 1995 in Wilton House, England, at the British Foreign Office conference on "Europe's Balkan Wars: Lessons for the International Community." Fact 2: I stated my position in 1996 in Belgrade at the hearing organized by the International Commission on the Balkans, established by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Aspen Institute. Fact 3: I gave a speech in 1996 at the conference on "National Questions and Boundaries: How to Reconcile Them Peacefully?" organized by the British Embassy and the British Council in Belgrade. Fact 4: In the winter 1996-97 I spoke at a dozen protest rallies throughout Serbia against the ruling regime’s attempt to rig the local elections. Fact 5: In 1997 I organized and became chairperson of the Council for Cooperation of the Non-Governmental Organizations in FRY. Fact 6: In July 1998 I was elected chairperson of the newly formed Council for Democratic Transformation of Serbia. Fact 7: In July 1999 I was elected chairperson of the newly formed Council of the opposition radio station “Index” in Belgrade. Finally, since the removal of Cosic dozens of my articles, interviews and letters have been published in journals and newspapers in FRY and in the West.

                Ms Secor quotes Sheyla Benhabib on our six-year co-editorship of the former “Praxis International” journal. Anyone who is familiar with the journal contents knows that numerous articles (along with one special issue) critical of what was going on in Yugoslavia and Serbia were published in the journal in those years. I must “confess” that for all practical purposes Sheyla Benhabib was the main editor since I let her make all basic decisions. Consequently I am unable to understand what it is exactly she is blaming me for in her interview to Ms Secor.

 

December 12, 1999, St. Louis, MO.                                                     Svetozar Stojanović


Svetozar Stojanović                                                                                                          UDK 342.1

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory                                                                  Originalni naučni rad

Belgrade, Yugoslavia

 

 

NATION, NATIONALISM AND CITIZENISM

 

Abstract: From among “family resemblance”-based groups called nations it is possible to isolate two opposite “ideal types”. One is the state-territorial type, the other the cultural-ethnic type.

The meaning of “nationalism” can best be seen in situation of conflict of national claims. Thus I define nationalism as favoring one nation over another in such a conflict. Depending on whether this favoring takes place (1) when both nations are equally entitled to their claims or (2) when the former is less entitled to its claim than the latter, two kinds of nationalism should be clearly distinguished. It is only the second sense that ought to be evaluated negatively. It is typical for nationalists in the negative sense to apply double standards and thereby violate the ethical requirement of universalization.

Distinguishing between two kinds of nationalism in a nation vis-à-vis other nation(s) context should be extended within nations themselves. There, positive nationalism becomes negative when co-nationals are required to subordinate all of their identities, interests, rights, values, goals, ideals, and standards to those of the nation, and in the extreme case are called upon to completely submerge themselves into the nation. Instead of being open, inclusive, voluntary, flexible, dynamic, and complex, such a national identity is closed, exclusive, compulsive, rigid, static, and simple.

The state-territorial concept of nation may also be termed citizenist (or civic), since it encompasses all citizens of a country. Because massive cultural-ethnic nationalisms acted as an important generator of the tragedy of SFRY and FRY, some critics mistakenly believe that a citizenist (or civic) attitude and practice is by definition immune to the negative nationalist temptation. Such a naïveté prompted me some years ago to coin the term “citizenism. A democratic state is obliged to treat all of its citizens equally regardless of their cultural-ethnic nationality. Undoubtedly, the citizenist (civic) principle of “one citizen-one vote” stands as an immense achievement of modern civilization–indeed, without it democracy is not possible. Yet realization of this principle is not in itself a sufficient warrant against the domination of one cultural-ethnic nation over other such nations. When this happens, the principle of citizenship in the positive sense turns into its opposite, citizenist nationalism (nationalist citizenism).

Shallow cartography and cartoanalysis is most often motivated by the citizenist viewpoint, the practice and imageology (my coinage defined in the text) that neglects, forgets, suppresses, and conceals cultural-ethnic national divisions. I plead for a new, in-depth cartography and cartoanalysis.  Multi-layered maps should be made, reflecting linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural, economic, military, genocidal...  sediments.  Shallow cartography and cartoanalysis is one of the reasons politics tends to be reactive rather than preventive.

Key words: Nation, nationalism, citizen, citizenism, religion, imageology, Yugoslavia, Tito, USA, Germany, NATO.

 

 

1.       What is nation?

2.        

Persistent attempts to establish necessary and sufficient identifiers (“differentia specifica”) for large social groups (“genus proximum”) called nations have failed. Most often it was argued that nations are distinguished from each other by language, religion, ethnic descent, state, territory, history, tradition, custom, values, symbols.... It is easy to come up with examples that discredit such attempts. Serbs, Croats and Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims, for example, are three separate nations despite shared language and common Slavic descent.  Russians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians, Armenians, Serbs, Macedonians... are Eastern Orthodox Christians (except for the atheists and religious agnostics), yet they are undoubtedly different nations. For centuries, Jews had no state of their own, yet hardly anyone disputed their national distinctness. After all, even today, an overwhelming majority of national groups do not have their own state. Finally, nations that coincide with citizenship, such as the U.S., are to be found only in a smaller portion of the world.

I believe that in the category “nation” we can include only such large social groups that share, to borrow a Wittgensteinian term, “family resemblance” rather than those that share “necessary and sufficient characteristics”. This means that for each group we call nation we should be able to determine at least  one of the above mentioned identifiers that that group has in common with at least one other such group. Self-identification as members of the group–through the feeling of belonging and attachment to that historically continuous group with its own name and experience as a separate community–is the only necessary (but not sufficient) identifier.

From among these “family resemblance”-based groups it is possible to isolate two opposite “ideal types”. One would be the state-territorial type, the other the cultural-ethnic type. Reality, of course, does not coincide wholly with these types. Thus, for example, even two very different notions of nation, American (state-territorial) and German (cultural-ethnic), overlap to some degree.

Language as a typical identifier of the cultural-ethnic nation serves an important function in the state-territorial one too. In order for immigrants to become United States citizens, and thus Americans, they must demonstrate at least elementary knowledge of the English language. In addition to language, similar national-integrative function is performed by socialization and education based on U.S. history, its traditions, customs, values, symbols. Another similarity with the cultural-ethnic type of nation is the growing tendency of Americans to stress their specificities as African-American, Mexican-American, Polish-American, Japanese-American, Italian-American, etc.

Germans (and the nations of Central, East and South-East Europe under their influence) developed a cultural-ethnic concept of nation. This does not mean, however, that they do not recognize that the territorial state has a great, sometimes even decisive, role in constituting and preserving national identity and continuity.

I say cultural-ethnic nation rather than ethnic-cultural nation because common ethnic descent is much more of a fiction than is shared culture. Indeed, what is the likelihood that a nation (unless it has long existed in complete, uninterrupted isolation from other nations) is actually descended from the same ancestors even a dozen generations back, let alone longer? How much “shared blood” do ordinary Germans have with their former monarchs and nobles? Isn’t this skepticism regarding common ethnic genealogy justified also in the case of the Serbs and their dynasties? (After all, Petar II Karadjordjevic and his two brothers were born of a Romanian mother.) Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate: we have not yet seen a Serb with the physical appearance of a Chinese.

Both described concepts of nation, the state-territorial and the cultural-ethnic ones, are sociogenetic, historical and realistic. The purely ethnic concept of natiogenesis, on the contrary, has a biogenetic, ahistorical and mythical character (this illusion of the nation as a “community of blood and soil” has often led to genocide).

So, is nation a construct or is it a given? At one end are those who deconstruct nation, claiming it is merely an “imagined” or even “artificial” community. Others deterministically proclaim it to be a community fully given by nature, fate, history (and sometimes even God). My position is somewhat closer to constructivism. Fortunately, this is a false dilemma, for nations are historically constructed and built, not in an entirely arbitrary manner, and certainly not ex nihilo but rather from given materials that have grown over time into their specific features. To use Marx’s insight about history from the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: People make their own nation, but not after their own will and not in the circumstances of their own choosing, but rather in the immediate circumstances they happen to find that are given and inherited. From the fact that somebody was accidentally born to his/her particular family and not some other-and consequently into a particular national milieu-in no way follows that he/she will relate to it casually. School and the wider social environment will still further socialize, educate and culturate him/her into his nation. Only as an adult will a person perhaps be in a position critically to evaluate (or re‑evaluate) and define (or redefine) his/her given national framework.

 

 

3.       Some thoughts on the relation between nation and monotheistic religions

 

Oftentimes Judaism, Christianity and Islam are major components of national identities.  As such, they offer not only a direct transcendental guarantee of individual immortality but also strengthen that guarantee for those who belong to national communities.

The conversion (real or self-styled) of quite a number of communist atheists and agnostics into self-declared religious believers, and communist internationalists into ardent adherents of their particular nations is intriguing.

Many commentators have compared the communism of the revolutionary stage with early Christianity, even classified it as a form of religiosity. The role of God, of course, was supplanted by a perfect Future, for which many lives were sacrificed. The early communists had no illusion that they themselves would live to see the classless society, but they believed they would still be part of it in some moral and spiritual fashion. The similarity with Christian faith in this regard is unmistakable. Unlike Christianity, however, communism did not have a genuine metaphysical-transcendental reference point, therefore it could not be transmitted to more than one or two successive generations. The efforts to sustain communism as a sort of quasi-religion by sanctifying the embalmed bodies of communist leaders in mausoleums did not carry over to new generations.

Some metamorphoses in the life of Josip Broz Tito are also instructive. As he aged and was intimately  faced with the inevitability of death, some “undesirable” religious and national layers protruded from the depths of his youth. In 1953, after the burial of Boris Kidric, one of their Politbureau comrades, Milovan Djilas complained to Tito that “After death there is nothing”. Tito snapped back: “How do you know there is nothing!” Wasn’t this an agnostic-even a believer-suddenly breaking through and speaking from the mouth of a pronounced atheist? Was this the reason why Tito ordered that his gravestone not be adorned with the usual communist-atheist symbols? Could this possibly had something to do with Tito’s national self-identification as a Croat in 1964, after calling himself a Yugoslav for at least the previous twenty years? Drawing close to the end of his life he publicly boasted that he never signed a single death sentence. The real truth, of course, was the opposite: not only did he order individual death sentences, he brought into being an entire system of mass executions during WWII and even more after taking power. True, he made others sign the death warrants, as if he wanted to deceive God!

 

 

4.       What is nationalism?

 

The meaning of “nationalism” can best be seen in situation of conflict of national claims. Thus I define nationalism as favoring one nation over another in such a conflict. Depending on whether this favoring takes place (1) when both nations are equally entitled to their claims or (2) when the former is less entitled to its claim than the latter, two kinds of nationalism should be clearly distinguished.

I believe it is only the second sense that ought to be evaluated negatively. Nationalism in the first sense is almost universal, common sense, benign group partiality from which, presumably, any realistic social practice and conception-even one that is moral and ethical-must start. After all, what would self-identification, belonging, attachment and loyalty to a nation mean at all if not this minimum predilection? No one can persuasively disqualify such bias as “national egotism.”

Those people who even in the position of equally valid entitlements are not concerned with the interests of their own nation more than those of other nations usually play into the hands of bad nationalists in their midst. (After all, the world is nowadays concerned even with the survival of endangered animal and plant species.) If they do it exclusively to their personal detriment rather than to the detriment of their nation they should be called national altruists. National masochists are very different: they favor other nations at both personal and national expense. And yet quite different from both are anti-national egoists, let alone national profiteers who derive personal gains from their “national generosity”. Behind their rejection of nationalism there lies utter selfishness that takes personal interests as the measuring-rod of all things.

Naturally, there is no moral duty to live a life of an extreme altruist. Even less can we expect for such an  attitude to govern the conduct of nations. Genuine internationalist principle does not require national self-denial, whether altruistic or masochistic. Rather, it only demands that nations do not favor themselves over those who are more entitled to their claims.

Many Serbs obsessively “fight Serbian nationalism. Some of them used to do it already under communism, while others began imitating them in post-communism.[1] As if nationalism were not a specific response to challenges and conflicts, and as if it could be limited and controlled effectively by denunciation, instead of realistic responses and solutions.

Nationalism in the positive sense degenerates into nationalism in the negative sense when self-identification and loyalty to one’s own nation becomes more important than considerations of justice and morality. Nationalism can assume quite malign forms such as chauvinism and nazism when the principle that natio nationi lupus est starts to reign supreme.

In order for one’s attitude to be rightly criticized as nationalist one does not necessarily have to belong to the nation in question. It would hardly be a reliable definition of an important concept, if a person’s attitude could not be judged as “nationalistic” until one learned about his/her nationality. Of course, the likelihood of someone’s giving in to the negative nationalistic temptation is incomparably greater when his/her own nation is at issue.

It is typical for nationalists in the negative sense to apply double standards and thereby violate the ethical requirement of universalization. For example, Croatian nationalists support a distinct “political-territorial entity” of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Herzeg-Bosnia) or even their full secession, and at the same time deny that right to the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, let alone in Croatia (Krajina). Serbian nationalists, on the other hand, support those rights of Serbs, but they deny it to Albanians in Kosovo. As for Albanian nationalists, they support Albanian rights to secession in Kosovo, but deny it to Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalists (meta-nationalists) in the U.S. support such Albanian position. On the other hand, secessionist aspirations of the Kurds in Turkey receive no support from those same U.S. circles, although Kurds have no state of their own, whereas Albanians do (Albania).  As a justification for the application of opposite criteria to two essentially identical cases U.S. nationalists usually say that Turkey is, as a member of NATO, of vital importance for U.S. national interests.  This is (meta‑)nationalism of double standards par excellence.

The dictum “Put your own house in order first” is often misinterpreted and misused. It does not imply a moral duty to be critical exclusively toward the nationalism of one’s own nation. Indeed, those who display indifference (or even scorn) toward their own “national house” have no right to appeal to this dictum. What is more, they should explain in which sense it is their house at all!

Unfortunately, “Yugoslavism” turned out to be an incomparably weaker construct than that of cultural-ethnic nations within Yugoslavia. Anti-Serbian nationalists have invariably disqualified it as a covert form of Serbian hegemonism and unitarianism. Be that as it may, those who continue identifying nationally as “Yugoslavs” have to try as much as possible to put in order all national houses of the former Yugoslavia, and not only the Serbian. Of course, those who identify as “a-national cosmopolitans,” should consider all nations of the world as their own house to be put in order.

Distinguishing between two kinds of nationalism in a nation vis-à-vis other nation(s) context should be extended within nations themselves. There, positive nationalism becomes negative when co-nationals are required to subordinate all of their identities, interests, rights, values, goals, ideals, and standards to those of the nation, and in the extreme case are called upon to completely submerge themselves into the nation. Such a nationalist collectivism suppresses and conceals individual, group, class and other cleavages. Instead of being open, inclusive, voluntary, flexible, dynamic, and complex, such a national identity is closed, exclusive, compulsive, rigid, static, and simple.

 

 

5.       What is citizenism?

 

The state-territorial concept of nation may also be termed citizenist (civic), since it encompasses all citizens of a country. Because massive cultural-ethnic nationalisms acted as an important generator of the tragedy of SFRY and FRY, some critics mistakenly believe that a citizenist (civic) attitude is by definition immune to the negative nationalist temptation. In reality, however, the latter may just as easily slide into negative nationalism as the former.

Such a naïveté prompted me some years ago to coin the term “citizenism”. A democratic state is obliged to treat all of its citizens equally regardless of their cultural-ethnic nationality. Undoubtedly, the citizenist (civic) principle of “one citizen-one vote” stands as an immense achievement of modern civilization–indeed, without it democracy is not possible. Yet realization of this principle is not in itself a sufficient warrant against the domination of one cultural-ethnic nation over other such nations. When this happens, the principle of citizenship in the positive sense turns into its opposite, citizenist nationalism (nationalist citizenism). Cultural-ethnic interests, rights, values, institutions… other than those of the dominant group are instead of determining state organization and legitimation relegated to civil society only. A Marxist analysis and critique of the abstract citizen (citoyen) could be, mutatis mutandis, applied here, with the difference that now the abstractness hides a cultural-ethnic instead of bourgeois dominance.

Of the two most advanced historical precedents of states-nations, France and the U.S., the latter has become so multi-cultural and multi-ethnic that it has been referred to as “microcosm of humanity”. It indeed comes as close to the ideal case of the citizenist (civic) conception of nation and state as one comes across in the world today. U.S. imageological[2] and other domination of the world justify focussing critique primarily on it.

Many Americans see their (state-territorial) concept of nation as much more valid compared to the cultural-ethnic one. What is more, they tend, by definition, to reduce the concept of nationalism to the cultural-ethnic one. This is one of the reasons they tend to reject offhand any possibility of U.S. nationalism.

As violence often plays a major role in the emergence of states and nations, U.S. citizenism was to a great degree born out of suppression and repression. U.S. state-nation was indeed forged on the foundation of genocide and ethnocide against the indigenous peoples. In addition, African slave labor was built into its original economic foundations. And until very recently the descendants of those Africans were deprived of civil rights, and were thus virtually excluded from U.S. citizenship. The hidden dimension of the U.S. is the historic dominance of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant cultural-ethnic core (by now greatly diminished). Put another way, the current state-nation has concealed the nation-state.

For many U.S. citizenists, stressing cultural-ethnic identities in their country is a form of nationalist blasphemy. They are willing to tolerate to some extent discourse on the multicultural but not on the multinational character of the United States. For them, it is a priori unacceptable that cultural-ethnic specificities could be taken out of the framework of the “civil society” and potentially be used to call into question the existing system. The principle of “one citizen-one vote” may not be supplemented by the principle “one nation-one vote.” Under no circumstances would they assent to a redesign of the U.S. constituent states and states’ lines based on cultural-ethnic criteria.

In the case of Yugoslavia, those individuals and political parties that insisted on citizenship as the only principle of state organization and legitimacy in the new independent states-Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia-would have to have insisted (but didn’t) that the Kosovo Albanians accept the unitarian organization of Serbia (“one citizen-one vote”)! That, however, would be a repressive citizenist-nationalist concept and practice.

It is not true that parties with a purely citizenist (civic) orientation occupy the center of the political spectrum of typically multi-national states, such as SFRY used to be, and as FRY, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia continue to be. (Prior to its “ethnic cleansing” of Serbs, Croatia also belonged in the same category as FRY.) In such circumstances, the centrist position in the political constellation is kept by those parties that combine the citizenist and the cultural-ethnic approach to the organization and legitimation of the state.

 

 

6.       Shallow or deep political cartography?

 

Fissures, rifts, erosions, underground streams, eruptions, earthquakes – I think geological metaphors are quite appropriate in analyzing the break-up and disintegration of SFRY. In my previously published criticism of the prevailing geo-political cartography, I pointed out that it overlooks the layers of division that are hidden below the official maps of political divisions in the world.  Shallow cartography and cartoanalysis is most often motivated by the citizenist viewpoint, the practice and imageology that neglects, forgets, suppresses, and conceals cultural-ethnic national divisions. I plead for a new, in-depth cartography and cartoanalysis.  Multi-layered maps should be made, reflecting linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural, economic, military, genocidal...  sediments.  Shallow cartography and cartoanalysis is one of the reasons politics tends to be reactive rather than preventive.

The tendency towards the dissolution of multi-national states is gaining momentum.  During his tenure as Secretary General of the U.N., B. B. Ghalli expressed his anxiety that in a couple of decades, if the current trend continues, there will be about 500 independent states in the world.

Some philosophers and social scientists have expressed skepticism regarding the survival chances of multi-national states as democracies.  They see dictatorships as the only obstacles preventing the dissolution of such states along national lines. The collapse of USSR, SFRY, CSSR, and even FRY is taken as a further proof of the thesis.  By the way: as far back as the early ‘60s, I advocated a gradual introduction of party pluralism into SFRY because I feared that an abrupt, unchecked introduction of it would precipitate the country’s violent disintegration along national lines.

My own view is, of course, that no "iron law" of disintegration exists, but only a strong tendency toward it. Such a tendency is present not because of the multi-national composition of states per se, but because of the territorial concentration of nations within those states. The capitalist market in U.S., for example, successfully uprooted immigrants and descendants of recent immigrants from areas where their cultural-ethnic compatriots tended to concentrate and dispersed them throughout the country.  On the other hand, in countries like Canada, Belgium or Great Britain this has not happened.

 

 

 

Svetozar Stojanović

 

Nacija, nacionalizam i građanizam

 

Rezime

 

Apstrakt: Iz “srodnički sličnih” grupa koje zovemo nacijama moguće je izdvojiti dva suprotna “idealna tipa''. Jedan bi bio državno-teritorijalni a drugi kulturno-etnički.

Značenje ''nacionalizma'' možemo najbolje videti u sukobu nacionalnih pretenzija. Zato ga i definišem kao davanje prednosti jednoj naciji nad drugom u takvom sukobu. Pritom valja jasno razlikovati dve vrste nacionalizma. Prvi:  kad se prednost daje jednoj naciji nad drugom iako obe imaju podjednako pravo na tu pretenziju. I drugi:  kad se prednost daje naciji koja ima manje pravo na nju. Smatram da isključivo nacionalizam u ovom drugom smislu treba vrednovati negativno. Tipično je za nacionaliste u negativnom smislu da primenjuju dvostruka merila i time krše etički zahtev univerzalizacije

Razlikovali smo dve vrste nacionalizma u odnosu nacije prema drugim nacijama. Međutim, njih možemo razlikovati i unutar nacije. Tu se nacionalizam u pozitivnom smislu deformiše u nacionalizam u negativnom smislu onda kad se od pripadnika nacije zahteva da sve svoje identitete, interese, prava, vrednosti, ciljeve, ideale, merila potčine nacionalnim, a u ekstremnom slučaju i sasvim utope u naciju. Umesto da bude otvoren, inkluzivan, dobrovoljan, fleksibilan, dinamičan i složen, takav nacionalni identitet je .zatvoren, ekskluzivan, prinudan, rigidnan, statičan, uprošćen.

Državno-teritorijalni pojam nacije možemo nazvati i gradjanističkim (civilnim) jer obuhvata sve gradjane, odnosno državljane jedne zemlje. Zbog masovnog kulturno-etničkog nacionalizma kao generatora tragedije SFRJ i SRJ, neki kritičari su pogrešno poverovali da je gradjanistički (civilni) stav per definitionem  imun na negativno nacionalističko iskušenje. Reagujući na tu naivnost, pre nekoliko godina skovao sam pojam “građanizam". Demokratska država je dužna da podjednako tretira sve svoje građane nezavisno od njihove kulturno-etničke nacionalnosti. Nema sumnje da je građanističko (civilno) načelo “Jedan građanin – jedan glas” ogromno dostignuće moderne civilizacije i da bez njega uopšte nije moguća demokratija. Pa ipak, sprovođenje tog principa ne predstavlja samo po sebi dovoljno jemstvo protiv dominacije jedne kulturno-etničke nacije nad drugim takvim nacijama. Kad do nje dođe, princip građanstva u pozitivnom smislu preokreće se u svoju suprotnost, gradjanistički nacionalizam  (nacionalistički gradjanizam.).

Plitka katografija i  kartoanaliza najčešće su motivisane građanističkim stavom, praksom i imidžologijom (moja kovanica definisana u tekstu) koja zanemaruje, zaboravlja, potiskuje i skriva kulturno-etničke nacionalne podele. Zalažem se novu, dubinsku kartografiju i kartoanalizu. Trebalo bi praviti višeslojne karte koje bi otslikavale jezičke, etničke, verske, kulturne, privredne, ratne, genocidne... sedimente. Politika je po pravilu sklona reaktivnosti a ne preventivnosti i zbog toga što polazi od plitke kartografije i plitke kartoanalize.

 

Ključne reči: Nacija, nacionalizam, gradjanin, gradjanizam, religija, imidžologija, Jugoslavija, Tito, SAD, Nemačka, NATO.

 



[1] In the 1980s, the remains of the Serbs thrown alive into karst sinkholes by the Ustashi-Nazis during World War II were disinterred and given a proper Eastern Orthodox religious burial. In some Serbian circles, however, this practice was indiscriminately attacked as nationalistic, thereby offending the intimate relationship between many Serbs, the Serbian nation, and Serbian Orthodox Christianity. All the more so since the descendants of those victims had certainly felt remorse for not having paid due respect to their relatives much earlier.

 

[2] I define imageology as a set of images that social groups use at the expense of truth, to justify their own actions and to discredit those of their rivals, opponents, and enemies. This critical concept is modeled after my definition of ideology as a set of ideas that social groups use at the expense of truth, to justify their own actions and to discredit those of their rivals, opponents, and enemies. However, I have noticed that philosophers, social theorists and generally intellectuals tend to continue over-emphasizing the role of ideas in image creation and even reduce it to them. Nothing can be further from the truth in our times dominated by audio/visual mass media. My  “imageology” (and “imageology critique”) is a concept broader than “ideology” (and “ideology critique”), the latter being but one kind of the former, moreover one ever more loosing in importance.